Published on the 15th of the month.

Vol. XVI, No. 12. MARCH, 1927.

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D.

CONTENTS

PAGE

The Composite Book from the Modernist Point of View 661
The Editor.

The Need of Religious Modernism 670
H. J. Trueman, M.A.

Bishop Butler 678
The late Hastings Rashdall, D.D., D.C.L.

Modernism and the Young 695
L. C. Rowan-Robinson, M.B., Ch.B.

Hope in Action 699
Sir Arthur F. Hort, M.A.

Book Reviews:
Critical Catholicism 708
The Apostolic Message 714
The Men of Latitude 715

Correspondence 716

OXFORD: BASIL BLACKWELL, 49 BROAD STREET

AGENTS: South Africa—T. Maskew Miller, Cape Town.
Australasia—Geo. Hicks, 54 Victoria Street, Wellington.
United States—Arthur Brentano, New York.

Price 1/- net. (Annual Subscription, 10/6.)

Cadbury means Quality

Two Popular Hotels in Central London.

OPPOSITE THE BRITISH MUSEUM.

THACKERAY HOTEL

Great Russell Street, LONDON, W.C.1.

NEAR THE BRITISH MUSEUM.

KINGSLEY HOTEL

Hart Street, Bloomsbury Square, LONDON, W.C.1.

FIRST CLASS TEMPERANCE HOTELS.

200 Rooms in each Hotel. Modern Arrangements.

REFINEMENT. ECONOMY.

Electric Radiators in all Bedrooms.

Bedroom, Breakfast and Attendance, from 8s. 6d. per night.

Illustrated Booklet on Application.

Telegrams:—

THACKERAY HOTEL: **'Thackeray, London.'** KINGSLEY HOTEL: **'Bookcraft, London.'**

RIPON HALL, OXFORD.

(Founded by Bishop Boyd Carpenter, D.D., D.C.L., K.C.V.O., at Ripon in 1898, moved to Oxford in 1919.)

Warden: The Right Rev. T. B. STRONG, D.D., Mus.D., D.Litt., G.B.E., Lord Bishop of Oxford.

Principal: **Rev. H. D. A. MAJOR. M.A., D.D.**

Vice-Principal: **Rev. J. S. BEZZANT, M.A.**

Tutor: Rev. F. L. CROSS, M.A., B.Sc.

RIPON HALL is a Graduate Theological College designed to afford a training on modern lines to candidates for Holy Orders in any diocese of the Anglican Communion.

Full particulars of the Course, Fees, Exhibitions, etc., can be had on application to the Principal, Ripon Hall, Oxford.

Laymen who desire a broad-minded, sympathetic, and well-educated Clergy can materially assist this end by contributing to the Exhibition Fund of Ripon Hall.

THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 12. MARCH, 1927. Vol. XVI.

THE COMPOSITE BOOK FROM THE MODERNIST POINT OF VIEW

By The Editor.

FOR full twenty years the Church of England has awaited revision of the Book of Common Prayer which it was hoped would bring order and unity, enlightenment and harmony, into our conduct of Divine Worship. The long period of waiting has not been easy to bear. Eager reformers and suffering congregations have cried out, like the souls of the righteous under the altar, 'How long, O Lord, how long?'; but they were reduced to silence by the widely-reported comment of the Primate: 'The longer Prayer-Book revision takes the better it will be.' Now at last the *Expectans expectavi* of the faithful is ended and *Laudate Dominum* and *Miserere mei* have taken its place.

The three schools in the Church view with different degrees of approbation and disapprobation the revision presented in the Composite Book. To the Evangelicals it comes as a veritable *donum exitiale.* It seems to them to contain that which will, when once it is admitted within the citadel, effect the capture and dissolution of the Church of England. It is not unnatural that they should take this view, for the Evangelicals have gained nothing by the revision except the right to retain the old book. The two schools that have gained are the Anglo-Catholic

and the Modernist. Neither has gained nearly as much a it desired. Owing to a certain vagueness on an importan point, which we shall deal with later, the Anglo-Catholic stand in certain eventualities to gain much more than is at first sigh realised. It seems to the Modernist that the Anglo-Catholi has on the whole gained most; yet the Modernist is more read to accept the Composite Book than is the Anglo-Catholic. Wh this is may be hard to say, but it is partly because the Moderni gains are of a solid kind and will never be lost, and partly be cause the Modernist is somewhat more patient than the Anglo Catholic, knowing full well that far more Christian educatio of a modern kind must be imparted before he can hope that th desired reforms can come securely and satisfactorily. More over, provided real progress is being made, rapid progress not essential. The Modernist believes that the future is his that the deeper movements are in his favour: and that all tha is best in Catholicism and Evangelicalism must inevitably b re-moulded by Modernism.

It is especially worth while on this occasion to put on recor the Modernist's causes for thankfulness at what is offered b the Composite Book. These gains are really greater than a first appears. We enumerate them, not in order of importanc but in the order in which they occur in the book:

(1) We have an improved Lectionary—the Table of Lesson of 1922 as revised in 1927.

(2) A better liturgical arrangement of the Psalter, with pe mission to omit a number of objectionable verses.

(3) The optional shortening of Morning Prayer and Even ing Prayer when followed immediately by another service. Th minister may begin with 'O Lord, open thou our lips,' and en with the Third Collect, or end with the Canticle after the Secon Lesson, or after the Canticle he may omit the Lesser Litan Lord's Prayer and Versicles, and simply say the three Collects

(4) Alternative services of Morning Prayer and Evenin Prayer are provided. These possess several advantages. (An increase in the selection of prefatory sentences arranged a cording to the Church's seasons. (Here we observe that 'th wicked man' has disappeared, presumably owing to the di

appearance of the squire.) (*b*) An abbreviated form of Exhortation, Confession and Absolution. (*c*) The *Venite* stops happily with 'the sheep of his hand.' (*d*) Psalm li (rightly omitting the last verse) may be sung instead of the *Benedicite*. (*e*) After the anthem, the minister is given a wider choice in the selection of prayers, including permission to use extempore prayer.

(5) The Apostles' Creed may be substituted for the *Quicunque vult*. If the *Quicunque vult* is used a revised translation is provided. This is a great improvement, for in addition it is permitted that portions of the *Quicunque vult* may be sung which omit the anathemas. We are glad to see 'The Father infinite,' etc., substituted for 'The Father incomprehensible,' etc. This emendation was urgently demanded.

(6) The Litany may be abbreviated at the discretion of the minister, and when the Communion Service follows, the prayers at the end of the Litany may be omitted.

(7) A large and valuable supplement is made to the Occasional Prayers and Thanksgivings.

(8) The Feast of the Circumcision is recognized as New Year's Day by a second collect, and an alternative is provided to the third Good Friday Collect. The Feasts of St. Mary Magdalene and the Transfiguration have been supplied with Collect, Epistle and Gospel.

(9) An alternative Order for the Administration of Holy Communion has been provided. The features which Modern Churchmen will value in it are: (*a*) The shortened Decalogue, from which the creation of the world in six days, and 'a jealous God,' have been eliminated. Also permission is given to use our Lord's summary on at least three Sundays in the month. (*b*) The restoration to the laity of the privilege of reading the Epistle. (*c*) An alternative shortened form of Invitation, Confession and Absolution for all occasions except Sundays. (*d*) The insistence (by an altered arrangement) on the use of the First Post-Communion Thanksgiving and also the Second. (*e*) The permission to use shorter forms in administering the Elements. (*f*) The insertion of a new Whit-Sunday Preface which eliminates the reference to the Gift of Tongues and its identification with the power to speak foreign languages by inspiration.

(10) A greatly improved Service for the Public Baptism o Infants, in which (*a*) the terrible words 'conceived and born i sin' are replaced by 'we are taught in Holy Scripture that Go willeth all men to be saved, for God is love.' (*b*) The referenc to Noah and his ark, and the passage of the Red Sea, disappea (*c*) The permission for parents to stand as sponsors for thei own child, provided the child have one other sponsor. (*d*) Th recitation of the Baptismal Creed by both priest and godparent together, instead of its being put clause by clause to the latte for their consent. (*e*) A definite and solemn promise is made b godparents and parents to give the baptized infant a Christia upbringing. (*f*) A prayer for the home.

(11) A most beautiful form of Dismissal added to the Con firmation Service:

> 'Go forth into the world in peace; be of good courage; hold fas that which is good; render to no man evil for evil; strengthen th fainthearted; support the weak; help the afflicted; honour all men love and serve the Lord, rejoicing in the power of the Holy Spirit.'

(12) A much improved Marriage Service. (*a*) The reason for marriage are more happily enumerated. (*b*) Adam and Ev and the Israelite patriarchs and their wives disappear. (*c*) Th promises of bridegroom and bride are made identical. (*d*) Th husband *shares* his goods with his wife. (*e*) Provision is mad for Holy Communion at the wedding by inserting a speci Collect, Epistle and Gospel. (*f*) There are other minor im provements, *e.g.*, it is recognized that the *Epistle to the Hebrew* was not written by St. Paul.

(13) There are many alterations and some improvements i the seldom-used Service for the Visitation of the Sick. Th commendatory and other prayers are helpful, as also the list o suitable psalms and lections. Some will also value the provisio for laying hands on the sick. The alternative Collects, Epist and Gospel provided for the Communion of the Sick will b appreciated. Intinction is allowed with the Bishop's consent.

(14) In the Burial Service shorter alternative Lessons a provided. The prayers for the departed and the mourners a a desirable addition. The Service for the Burial of a Child wi be valued.

(15) The Commination Service is exonerated from the charge that on Ash Wednesday morning we go to church to curse our neighbours.

(16) The Ordination of Deacons substitutes for 'Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures?' 'Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and the New Testament, as given of God to convey to us in many parts and in divers manners the revelation of himself which is fulfilled in our Lord Jesus Christ?'

There is also an admirable Office for the Making of Deaconesses. It is interesting to note that although a New Testament is delivered to the Deaconess by the Bishop and she is bidden to be diligent in its study, yet is she not questioned as to what she believes about it.

On the whole, the newer compositions are good English, although there are some which strike us as of poor quality, *e.g.*, two of the prayers for the Healing of the Sick, and the additional Collect on Easter-Day.

Taken all in all, the Composite Book provides much for which the Modernist may feel truly thankful. There are certainly some things retained, and even some things added, which he wishes the authorities had eliminated, *e.g.*, the terrible word *satisfaction* retained in the Prayer of Consecration. This represents a purely mediaeval scholastic theory of the Atonement abandoned by all our great English theologians, and it probably has never been believed by our modern laity. The statement is retained in the same prayer that Christ did 'in his Holy Gospel command us to continue a perpetual memory of that his precious death until his coming again.' The Bishops are surely well aware that modern textual criticism renders it impossible to assert this with conviction. The proper form of the so-called Nicene Creed could have been given to us without any injury to Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals: the historic 'We believe' substituted for 'I believe': and the unjustifiably intruded *filioque* clause eliminated. Such emendations, by taking us back to original forms, would bring us closer to the Eastern Orthodox Churches. As the Virgin-Birth clause was not in the original Nicene Creed, that also might have been eliminated without

injury to our traditionalists, seeing that it is retained in the Apostles' Creed and elsewhere in the Prayer-Book—but this we could hardly expect.

We could wish the word *regenerate* had been removed from the revised services of Baptism. Plain people do not know what it means. The pompous suffrage 'Grant that whosoever is here dedicated to thee by our office,' etc., could have been excised without loss, as also the needless question 'Hath this child been already baptized or no?' which spoils the opening of the service. It is a pity also that *consecrate* was not substituted for '*sanctify* this water.' The service is really too long, but it is not easy to shorten it.

The revised Burial Services whether on land or at sea are disappointing. Though there is probably not one of the Bishops who revised the services who believes that the body committed to the ground or sea will ever be united to the human being that bore it, yet this traditional belief is not frankly abandoned. In the land service reference is made to changing 'the body of our low estate' into the likeness of his glorious body, and in the sea service these words are retained: 'Looking for the resurrection of the body (when the sea shall give up her dead).' Sailors do not believe this, and it is not worth while retaining it for the marines. As the New Testament does not contain the phrase 'the Resurrection of the Body,' and as our theologians have abandoned the doctrine, it seems a great pity not to have eliminated these ambiguous, if not actually deceptive, phrases.

Considering that only a very limited number of those who are ordained are 'learned in the Latin tongue,' it is absurd to have retained this in the Preface to the Ordinal as a qualification for Holy Orders.

We could have wished that wherever the word *Ghost* occurs in our services, Spirit had been substituted. *Ghost* sounds curiously to-day, especially to young people. We should also have liked verse 2 in the *Jubilate* to run: 'It is he that hath made us, and we are his,' so following the Hebrew marg. Aquila, Jerome, and the Targum. It seems banal to tell God that we did not make ourselves. In the *Te Deum* such renderings as '*white robed* army of martyrs' and '*numbered* with thy saints' would have been acceptable. But we must stop being

meticulous. As Modernists we feel that the Confession of Faith admitted into the Grey Book might have been allowed as an optional alternative for the Apostles' Creed at the week-day and even at the Sunday services.

When the Decalogue is shortened for the Communion Office it seems a pity not to have shortened it also in the Catechism, as it was in the First Prayer-Book of Edward VI. Why our authorities did not give us a much more modern service for the Churching of Women, and include in it a thanksgiving for the birth of a child, we find it hard to comprehend.

Our revisers have unhappily retained such phrases as 'the great indignation of God against sinners,' 'there is no health in us,' 'the burden of them is intolerable,' 'provoking most justly thy wrath and indignation against us.' We should lose nothing worth keeping by their elimination; those who use the old book can always have them there.

There are additions of a traditionalist kind made in the Composite Book which Modernists do not like. Some are definitely reactionary, and others may be described in Calvin's phrase as *tolerabiles ineptiae*.[1] We recognize, however, that sops had to be thrown to Cerberus, and we may be thankful that they are neither larger nor more numerous. We do not propose even to specify them here.

There is one matter we must treat. It is the new Communion Office. Modernists who have a sound knowledge of liturgiology and are acquainted with such liturgical monographs as Fr. Adrian Fortescue's on *The Mass* (second edition), and the notable articles in Cabrol's *Dictionnaire* on Canon, Epiclèse, *Expositio missae*, etc., will recognize the soundness of Dr. Headlam's defence of the Revised Office in his two letters to the *Times*. The revision, instead of making for Transubstantiation, may be said to make it rather harder to hold than under the old form. It is urged that the authorization of two forms of Communion Service will split the Church. Hence we have the slogan: 'Divide the Book, do not divide the Church.' We are

[1] He wrote in 1555 to John Knox: 'In Anglicana Liturgia, qualem discribitis, multas video fuisse tolerabiles ineptias. His duobus verbis exprimo, non fuisse eam puritatem quae optanda fuerat; quae . . . ferenda ad tempus fuisse.'

unable to join in it. The Episcopal Scottish Church has two authorized Communion Offices and is much less divided than the English Church with one. In the Roman Church there are, besides the Roman Mass, the Ambrosian rite at Milan and the Mozarabic at Toledo. There are also the remains of an ancient rite at Lyons and the vernacular rites of the Uniate Churches. It is quite possible to have unity in diversity: it is not diversity which divides, but the *odium theologicum* or the *odium ecclesiasticum*. It is quite probable that a number of Modernists may prefer the old Communion Service to the new; but we believe that the bulk of Modernists recognize that the Church will lose if the New Rite is not authorized also.

For Modernists the *crux* of the New Rite is concerned with the Rubrics dealing with Reservation. Whilst we cannot help recognizing that the demand for Reservation for the Sick is almost entirely artificial and fictitious, and is put forward simply as a step towards Reservation for Adoration, yet when demanded it cannot well be refused. *Abusus non usum tollit.* 'The misuse of a thing,' as the judicious Hooker argued against the Puritans, 'doth not take away the lawful use of it.' Reservation for the Sick was the custom of the Church in the second century if not earlier. It is certainly not anti-Scriptural, and it may serve a practical purpose. Being demanded by a large number of our fellow-Churchmen, it cannot rightly be denied. Nevertheless, in view of its history our authorities are bound to take great precautions that Reservation be not misused. It is here that we feel they are open to serious criticism. While the Rubrics definitely forbid Reservation for any purpose except communicating the sick, no precise rules are given which will preclude the cultus of the Reserved Elements. There is a vague promise of such regulations. If such are promulgated, will the Bishops with their present powers be able to enforce them? Many are of opinion that the Bishops cannot possibly enforce them with their present powers, yet, strange to say, they are not seeking larger powers. This statement is not quite correct: they are seeking larger powers, but, as it seems to us, powers of the wrong kind. They are seeking powers by the proposed Prayer-Book Measure, 192-, to exercise the *Jus Liturgicum*, *i.e.*, the right to legislate in liturgical matters, in a way

and to a degree that they have never done during the last four hundred years.[2] As constitutionalists this fills us with alarm. To give the Episcopate power to frame our liturgical rules is a very serious matter in view of their record. We do not doubt their good faith, but we fear that when once they have the power to make liturgical rules they will yield to pressure, and we shall be plunged into worse confusion than has hitherto been the case. Every diocese will become a law unto itself, and possibly every parish. The policy of 'squeezing' the Bishops will grow in popularity, and in time only potentially squeezable Bishops will be appointed to the Bench.

In striving to secure for themselves the exercise of the *Jus Liturgicum*, the Bishops seem to us to be exposing themselves to great dangers, and the Church also. What the Bishops need is not power to make more liturgical rules, but the power to enforce by short, simple, inexpensive methods such liturgical rules as have been constitutionally authorised. Episcopal authority should be enforced by the penalties of censure, suspension, sequestration and deprivation, not by means of imprisonment. Have the Bishops the will and are they united in a common policy for securing authority to enforce obedience to the Composite Book? It is not clear that this is so. The Church of England is rapidly becoming the main instrument in this country for training converts[3] for the Church of Rome—a Roman *paedagogus*. Certainly to enforce order will temporarily increase this flow of converts to Rome, but it will check the Romeward drift of the English Church and so save it for the English people. Some two thousand clergy were unhappily deprived as the result of the last revision; there will be no need to deprive so many under the revision we are about to experience. While Modernists are convinced that education is the only real remedy for our ills, yet they also recognize that discipline in certain cases is an educational necessity.

[2] I (3) The archbishop and bishops of each province may from time to time make, and at their discretion rescind, rules for the conduct of public worship in accordance with the Composite Book (including any rules required or authorised to be made by them under any rubric of the Composite Book) and any rules so made shall have effect within the province for which the same are made as if contained in the rubrics of the Composite Book.

[3] About 12,000 *per annum*.

But what provision has been made by a united episcopate to face this situation? Is the episcopal policy that of the hero of the limerick?—

'There was an old man who said, How
Shall I deal with this terrible cow?
If I sit on this stile
And continue to smile,
I shall soften the heart of the cow.'

Only a resolute, united episcopate armed with authority to enforce laws, not to make them, can reduce the Church to order and loyalty. *Rem ad triarios redisse.* May we at last behold episcopal unity, courage, consistency, firmness, and thereafter the peaceable fruits of righteousness. Loyal bishops will create a loyal clergy, and a loyal clergy will receive the support of a loyal laity.

Οὐ πρὸς ἰατροῦ σοφοῦ
θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρὸς τομῶντι πήματι.[4]

THE NEED OF RELIGIOUS MODERNISM

By H. J. Trueman, M.A.

THERE is a saying by the great scholar Max Müller in his Gifford Lectures which sums up in most suggestive language that special view and value of Modernism which we are proposing to consider. Nothing, he says, is more difficult than to express the results of the deepest thought in language that should be intelligible to all, and yet not misleading. Unless a religion can do that, it is not a religion at all: at all events it cannot live: since every generation that is born into the world requires a popular, a childlike translation of the sublimest truths which have been discovered and stored up by the sages and prophets of old.

Men speak sometimes as if Modernism had to be apologized for as a perversely difficult and more abstruse presentation of an older and comparatively simple theology, whereas its highest aim properly is to remove the perplexities which dogmatic theo-

[4] Sophocles, *Ajax*, 581.

logy has put in the way of vital and intelligent religion and enable earnest souls who have been bewildered and estranged to recognize again the attractive simplicity of a confiding walk with God —a purposeful following of Christ.

If that is true, then the Modernist should be just the one to represent such a religion as Max Müller declares is necessary, for he will not shrink from the sublimest truths and it will be his joy to give them a popular and childlike translation in language that shall be intelligible to all.

All must recognize that modern knowledge has transformed the whole mental climate of the world, and as a consequence the theological terminology of a past age has lost its meaning for us; and yet the modern man needs salvation—needs to be shown a life worth living, and the chief obstacle to the Gospel, Prof. Matthews has reminded us, 'is not the presence of the modern mind but the modern absence of mind.' The gospel, indeed, does not appeal to people often, because it answers a question which they have forgotten to ask. That is, in part, because of the dull, unimaginative, and unconvincing Traditionalism which, instead of expressing, has obscured the adventurous religion of Christ which we profess, whereas Theology, we have been reminded, 'has to explain the meaning of living faith.'

So that, in making things simpler, in discarding unwholesome accretions in theology, while welcoming a healthy development, in what has been called 'Christianizing the common thought of God,' Modernism, perhaps unwittingly, makes things far more alive and provocative, and when we find ourselves taunted with being cold intellectuals, we are unmoved, for we can reassure ourselves by recalling another wise pronouncement of Max Müller:

> 'Let us reverence by all means what is called child-like faith, but let us never forget that to think is also to worship God.'

We have to translate and simplify the unintelligible elaborations of theology that men may be induced to think and, as Thomas Traherne expressed it, by thinking 'serve God in the interior Court'; for our fellow-Christians want 'something more than a tradition that has become for them the empty form in which men of other ages have tried to express their apprehension, under other conditions of life and knowledge, of the living God.'

> 'A church, therefore, which looks wholly to the past has no living message for the men of the present,' whereas 'those teachers of religion who are seeking to free the Gospel from the temporary forms in which it has been clothed are performing the work of Evangelists by translating the good news out of language which has grown archaic into words which speak directly to the man of to-day.'

But let us pause a moment to notice how in these thoughts from typical modern teachers all seems to cluster around such expressions as Salvation, Religion, Worship, the Gospel, the work of an evangelist, the Living God, a childlike Faith! Our so-called Modernism may strive 'to express the results of the deepest thought,' but it is for the sake of religion and not for the pleasure of playing with theology: it is to make God and the Eternal World more real, more understandable, and to give a dynamic to men who need, though they may not think they need, to walk with God.

That is such a significant saying of Dr. Matthews about the question men have forgotten to ask! Though the modern man needs salvation, he has to be aroused to feel his need, and some of us have wished we could wring Francis Thompson's hand for having written in the midst of his transcendental poetry these inspired lines:

> There is no expeditious road
> To pack and label men for God
> And save them by the barrel load!

Men must 'come to themselves' like the Prodigal Son, come to their best selves, find themselves, co-ordinate will, affection and intellect, and so cultivate divine Reason if they are to be in a wholesome state of salvation. The true Christian will be 'careful never to shutter the windows of his mind, nor to lose a sense of wonder'; and if Wonder is the beginning of Wisdom, if the mind is King, if the Holy Spirit's function is to lead us into the truth, then a would-be safe and comfortable dogmatic assurance, wedded, perhaps, to ritual observance, is in reality a dangerous thing, a sort of spiritual narcotic, and we cannot help seeing that, as the sadly-missed Maurice Pryke pointed out, with too many 'the gold of spiritual fellowship with Christ has been bartered for the dross of uniformity,' whether of organization or of belief.

'Spiritual fellowship with Christ!' That is, following the lead of the Holy Spirit. A true religion must for ever be a following of a living Christ and no mere copying of a long-ago Jesus, for as the great scholar Hort reminded us, 'It was not as an Example but as a Master that Christ spell-bound the Apostles.' And this Master is He who called Himself the Truth, as well as the Way, and the Life. It is imperative, then, to ask: Do we really know the truth for which we stand? Do we know it in such a way as to be able to interpret it to the mind of the age? For

> 'The Truth with which we are concerned is also a way and a life. It is a Truth which demands the most perfect concurrence of the intellect, emotions, and will for its apprehension. To know it is to have eternal life, to be faithful to it is life abundant. It is intellectual enough to give birth to theologies and philosophies which leave the mind breathless on the utmost edge of thought; yet it is too vital to be confined within the bounds of any system and can be grasped only in the passionate experience of the soul that loves and dares.'

If this is at all a just account of what it means to pursue the Truth, to follow Christ, and if we are indeed Truth-seekers, there can be nothing coldly aloof or idly ineffectual about our religious attitude. 'Love' and 'daring' must imply warmth and light and a loyal, unceasing quest; for, as Dr. Oman has warned us:

> 'There is no greater moral peril than to attempt to manipulate Truth, and the peril is by no means lessened because the task is piously performed. Obscurantism and timid pre-possession are of unbelief and not of faith—if faith is conviction of truth on its own recognisances.'

That brings us back to Maurice Pryke's phrases, 'the dross of uniformity' instead of 'the gold of spiritual fellowship with Christ.' We hold strongly that man is capable of fellowship with God, that religion is native to the heart of man, that Faith is the outgoing of the God-nature within to the God without, so that this Faith may be called 'the conviction of Truth on its own recognisances.' Man is endowed with faculties whereby he apprehends the ultimate things, and 'we needs must love the highest when we see it.' But over true, simple, indigenous religion webs of theological speculation have been spun, and it is for us to brush the cobwebs away, to re-interpret the ancient Truth, to open windows and show the far horizons of what has

been called 'the open country of the Spirit'; and Faith is sure that the clear call of Christ can awaken a natural response in hearts that have not become unnatural and artificial.

It is the duty of the Modernist teacher to awaken each man's whole understanding by 'a popular—if need be—a childlike translation of the sublimest truths'; and more than that, to have such a grasp of truth as to be able to meet men at the different stages and periods of their development and present a growing vision of Truth to meet their growing need. For, as Evelyn Underhill humorously expressed it in her deeply spiritual addresses to the clergy *Concerning the Inner Life*, 'Mangelwurzels do not suit every sheep at every stage of its growth.'

'The Church,' so we are warned, 'which shows no interest in the movement of thought will certainly sooner or later find that it is powerless to win men,' and it is for Dynamic Truth that we stand as against a static dogmatism. But more—it is essential to remember that Modernism is the champion of independence of thought and not of some clearly defined novelty of standpoint, so that no one need feel himself bound by any other man's revolutionary or conservative statements or think he is less a Modernist because he differs even violently from the opinions of certain other Modernists, for it is precisely this liberty of thought—the essential characteristic of the Modern attitude—which we hold is of such inestimable value for a free and progressive religion.

And this *caveat* with regard to the danger of such a monstrosity as Modernist dogmatism or infallibility may remind us of what we certainly must not omit—the influence of the individual Modernist. Personal influence will always be the most sacred force in the world, and the fearless thinker who walks in the light of truth will earn the description of a saint, offered by a little girl who had seen the gloriously coloured windows of a cathedral, and be 'a person who lets the light come through.' It was such an ideal as this that S. Paul must have had in his mind when he wrote from prison to his friends at Philippi and said, as Moffatt has translated it:

> 'I pray that you may be more and more rich in knowledge and all manner of insight, enabling you to have a sense of what is vital, so that you may be transparent'! (*Phil.* i, 9).

It has been recognized that 'To love Truth is not easy, but it is the condition of all fruitful work.' Again we are reminded of a dynamic: it is work and not speculation or even correctness of view that is to be the ultimate goal, that we may be not only followers, but also fellow-workers with Christ. A pure and undefiled religion needs to be safeguarded from error and from hampering accretions, and for this men are needed, thinking men, who find no mental effort too arduous to equip themselves to be clear-minded and simple-hearted champions of a childlike faith; men who are, in an illuminating phrase, 'expanding towards Eternity.' It was the great teacher Clement of Alexandria in the third century who declared, 'I call him truly learned who brings everything to bear on the truth, so that from geometry and music and grammar and philosophy itself, culling what is useful, he guards the faith against assault': such should be the aim of the individual Modernist—an aim that has hardly been bettered since those early days of the Church.

Let us then examine very briefly the attitude of Modernism towards certain important questions to see how it may 'guard the faith' in three regions of religious thought and effort—those of Biblical criticism, devotional worship, and relationship to God in Christ.

A certain school of Churchmanship would bind us, we know, to a mechanical use of the Bible and an unquestioning literalism of interpretation. But if we hold ourselves free to accept a rearrangement of the books of the Old Testament, how much easier it is to emancipate ourselves from unworthy thoughts of God, as we follow the gradual unfolding of man's understanding of the Divine character, and notice how the greatest of the Prophets break away from lower estimates, which indeed are there and which we can see to have been inevitable, but are gloriously superseded by nobler and worthier views at a higher level of development.

And in studying the New Testament, if we are at liberty, *e.g.* to accept a later date and non-apostolic authorship for the Fourth Gospel and to read it as a devout Ephesian's mature appreciation of that Holy Life, in what a much truer perspective can we see the meaning of the life of Jesus, and what an encouragement it is to find that ancient Modernist fearlessly re-

casting the more primitive Christology on larger lines in accordance with the highest thought of his time and place!

Another school of Churchmanship may tend to limit our ideas about prayer and sacraments, whereas the Modernist refuses to be bound by what he thinks materialistic tradition; and in reaching out after something more real and worthy is convinced that in this he is on the side of a true and living religion, because he is seeking a spiritual and no merely mechanical relation between God and the human soul. He is likely, too, to emphasise the danger, even though he will not condemn the individuals who seek the solace, of formal and habitual sacramental confession. This, he will do on the ground that the sacrament of Penance is calculated to 'turn into finite rule what ought to be a growing vision of infinity.'

That suggestive warning of Dr. Oman's against turning into finite rule what ought to be a growing vision of infinity might well be adopted as the Modernist's abiding safeguard, since he stands, not for any ultimate correctness of view, but for an undying quest.

The wholesome emancipation of the Modernist is also observable in his attitude towards a miraculous irruptionism which makes him 'careful not to seek for God's self-expression in the abnormal, but to look upon the normal as the sphere of His revelation.' He is sure that the Christian religion is, as Scott-Palmer expressed it, 'Incarnational through and through,' and he would avoid any views that would militate against his regarding the Incarnation 'as an event'—so the mystic Coventry Patmore defined it—'which is renewed in the body of everyone who is in the way to the fulfilment of his original destiny.' For the man of modern mind sees that if we maintain that a miraculous birth was necessary to bring God into humanity, we make assumptions about God and man and the relationship between the two which the best modern thought finds it impossible to entertain. The author of the Fourth Gospel seized on the loftiest thought and expression of his own day and sought to exalt the Divine Master as the Logos without troubling to explain how the Word became flesh, and it is certain that 'if the Modernist is inclined on occasion to jettison time-honoured phrases and venerable traditions, it is always with a view to an

increased adequacy of expression—never from the sense that previous interpreters of the Person of Jesus have set Him in too high a place.'

This is not the place to make any wider survey of the Modernist point of view, but here are wise words of summing up from Dr. Sanday which express admirably the task of the Modernist:

> 'I aim at thinking the thoughts and speaking the language of my own day, and yet at the same time keeping all that is essential in the religion of the past.'

Religion, all that we mean by walking with God, the following of Christ, is more important to the Modernist than Theology. Unless modern Theology can help our religion, we might as well wallow in mediaevalism and succumb to spiritual phthisis with closed doors and windows.

> 'All the conclusions of Natural Science and scientific criticism,' says the illuminating mystical teacher, Wilmshurst, 'are pointing to a God and to the great purpose of His Christ; but they point also to the necessity of apprehending those truths clearly, and of disengaging them from cobwebs of error, misunderstanding, and untenable doctrine about them spun by the speculative or perverse brains of schoolmen and theologians in days gone by. And, as they point to the old body of dogmatic teaching which the world is now rejecting, they seem to say, "Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, He is risen, and will be found in a Religion reconstituted on nobler, broader lines of thought, that will be not so much the contradiction as the fuller realisation of the old."'

That is surely a fine evaluation of the Modernist spirit in things of religion! And to match this account of the scientific attitude, we find Lily Dougall in her article on 'The Language of the Soul' suggesting to the ecclesiastical mind the need of a like assurance to correct its backward look. With this noble utterance we bring our study to a close:

> 'The ecclesiastical mind is constantly turning back, thinking to find the Lord in the dim atmosphere of Church History. The Christian too often thinks of Jesus Christ as in the past. He is not there. He has risen and gone before us into the future. Again and again in Christian ages the reformer has found Him in the farthest vista of his own advancing path; and we, entering an era of psychological discovery (and metaphysical restatement), find Him in front, awaiting us at the gate of a new day.'

BISHOP BUTLER[1]

By the late Very Reverend Hastings Rashdall, D.D., D.C.L., F.B.A.

UP till a few years ago Butler's *Analogy* still held its place among the few books usually prescribed for Ordination Examinations. It has certainly begun most rightly to disappear. To set before candidates for the ministry Butler's *Analogy* as a treasure-house of answers to the modern sceptic is really like bringing up a medical student upon the works of Hippocrates or of Galen. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the obsoleteness of Butler in many ways—especially of that second part of the *Analogy* in which he deals with Revealed Religion. Why, then, read a paper on Butler if he be dead? Had he not better be decently buried too? I reply that I have chosen him for two reasons: (1) I thought it would be interesting to ask the question 'Why does Butler's Apologetic strike the modern reader as so thoroughly out of date?' and I thought that the mere statement of these reasons would help to suggest the sort of apologetic by which it must be replaced. (2) Though Butler as a whole is out of date, there are elements in his thought which are still of real value, and I should like to call attention to them. I should be far from saying that Bishop Butler is no longer worth reading, or even that his works are of purely historical interest. For the young student who has perhaps hardly read another work of Christian Apologetic or Christian Philosophy, it is worse than useless to put into his hands a collection of good replies to objections which are not now made and untenable replies to those that are still urged. But such a book may be very instructive to the student sufficiently acquainted with more modern modes of thought to be able to recognize where the old apologist's arguments are, and where they are not, still available.

[1] As executor of the theological writings of the late Dean of Carlisle, I have come across a number of valuable unpublished papers. I hope to have the privilege of publishing a selection of them in successive numbers of the *Modern Churchman*.—Ed., M.C.

Butler's contribution to Theology may be studied under three heads. (1) There is the first part of the *Analogy* dealing with Natural Theology; (2) there is the second part dealing with Revealed Theology; and (3) there are the *Fifteen Sermons* which are chiefly concerned with Moral Philosophy.

I will deal with these three parts in order. But first I must say a word as to the argument of the *Analogy* as a whole. This is often misconceived. People vaguely suppose that Butler aimed at pointing out analogies between Natural and Revealed Religion. This mistake is sufficiently corrected by an attentive reading of the title-page. The work is styled: *The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature.* Butler is not seeking to prove Revealed Religion by showing the analogies which it exhibits to Natural Religion. Both Natural Religion and Revealed Religion are treated as things to be proved: and Butler proposes to prove them by showing that what were urged as objections both to Natural and Revealed Religion might equally be made to what nobody denied—the constitution and course of Nature. Now of course if by the constitution and course of Nature Butler had meant nothing but the actual facts of the Universe apprehended by the senses, such a line of argument would be worth nothing. If, for instance, it is objected that there is a certain injustice or inequality or arbitrariness in the Christian scheme of salvation, it is no answer to say that similar injustices are included in the course of nature, in the actual distribution of happiness and misery, in our liability to undeserved injury or unmerited help from our fellows and so on. The modern doubter would of course reply: 'Precisely so, and that is why I do not believe either that your scheme of salvation or that the course of nature comes from a just and perfect God, or indeed from any God at all.' But in Butler's time no one denied that Nature implied a creative Mind—an 'intelligent author of Nature,' as it was called. It was thought obviously impossible that the world could start itself. Given a Creator to start it, it could (as some supposed) go on very well of itself, though it was generally held further that the appearances of design in human organisms pointed to the exertion of occasional interference with the world-machine at later periods. And particularly the appearance of

new species was held to be something that could not possibly be accounted for by the laws of nature at all. Butler was able to assume that the existence of a creative and intelligent mind was something universally admitted. His opponents were not Atheists or Agnostics, but Deists. Deism was a mode of thought which was introduced by certain English writers in the later half of the seventeenth century. Lord Herbert of Cherbury is often spoken of as the first of the Deists; but the real impulse, I imagine, came from the much more anti-religious Thomas Hobbes, though his view of the omnipotence of the State compelled him to profess attachment to the principles of the Church of England as by law established, and so made it impossible for him formally to deny either the special truths of Christianity or the more fundamental principles of Natural Religion. Hobbes attended church because the law required him to do so, but took the liberty to absent himself from the sermon. But the whole tendency of his thought was profoundly sceptical and anti-Christian.

It may be suggested that, if the existence of God was admitted, nothing remained to be proved as regards what was called at the time Natural Religion. But that was not the case with at least some of the Deists. Most of their leading writers, indeed—men like Collins, Toland and Chubb—were professed believers in the righteousness of God, in the providential government of the world, and in future rewards and punishments. What they denied was the miraculous interference with the course of Nature, the special revelation of God in the Old and New Testaments, and the special doctrines of Christianity. But there were others who went further and denied that there was any reason to think of God as righteous, that there could be any communication between the divine and the human mind even in the voice of conscience, any meaning in worship, any grounds for belief in a future life. It must be remembered that, though the objections to established religious ideas found expression in the little group of deistical writers, Deism was a mode of thought which was propagated rather in conversation than by formal treatises, among more or less cultivated men of fashion than among philosophers and professed students, in coffee-houses and drawing-rooms rather than in universities or the

studies of serious thinkers. Even the deistical writers were not academical teachers or men of great learning, but laymen—sometimes cultivated laymen, at other times quite self-taught.

The situation is amusingly expressed by Bishop Berkeley:

> 'Lysicles smiled and said he believed Euphranor had figured to himself philosophers in square caps and long gowns, but thanks to these happy times the reign of pedantry was over. Our philosophers are of a different kind from those awkward students who think to come at knowledge by poring on dead languages and old authors, or by sequestering themselves from the cares of the world to meditate in solitude and retirement. They are the best-bred men of the age, men who know the world, men of pleasure, men of fashion, and fine gentlemen.
>
> *Euph.* I have some small notion of the people you mention, but should never have taken them for philosophers.
>
> *Cri.* Nor would anyone else till of late. The world was long under a mistake about the way to knowledge, thinking it lay through a tedious course of academical education and study. But among the discoveries of the present age one of the principal is the finding out that such a method doth rather retard and obstruct than promote knowledge.
>
> *Lys.* I will undertake that a lad of fourteen, bred in the modern way, shall make a better figure, and be more considered in any drawing-room or assembly of polite people, than one at four-and-twenty, who hath lain by a long time at school and college. He shall say better things, in a better manner, and be more liked by good judges.
>
> *Euph.* Where doth he pick up this improvement?
>
> *Cri.* Where our grave ancestors would never have looked for it, in a drawing-room, a coffee-house, a chocolate-house, at the tavern, or groom-porter's. In these and like fashionable places of resort it is the custom for polite persons to speak freely on all subjects, religious, moral or political. So that a young gentleman who frequents them is in the way of hearing many instructive lectures, seasoned with wit and raillery, and uttered with spirit' (*Alciphron,* Dial. I and II).

It was the objects that passed current in circles of this kind rather than in solemn philosophical arguments that Butler and the long line of Apologists of which he has become the most classical had really to deal with. And in these circles it is probable that the more destructive kind of attack upon Christianity was more frequent in the more guarded pages of the Deistical writers. These assailants, so far as they had any philosophical position at all, based themselves upon Hobbes' doctrine of universal selfishness. Unlike the kinds of modern anti-Christianity with which we are most familiar, much of this fashionable scepticism of George II's time was frankly anti-moral too. It was deliberately maintained that there was no reason why a man

should not gratify all his selfish passions and inclinations except in so far as the community for its own purposes found it necessary to create, by means of punishment, selfish inducements to restrain them. The Deity which this sort of Deism admitted was (as Carlyle expressed it) very much of an 'absentee Deity.' For these reasons that perfunctory admission of an 'intelligent author of Nature' which Butler was able to assume did not always establish anything which he or we could regard as amounting to a Natural Theology or Natural Religion. But his plan is to start with simply this admission, and to argue that the admitted and undeniable behaviour of this external rule of the Universe, as exhibited by the course of nature, exhibits analogies to the action which was attributed to Him by the scheme both of Natural and Revealed Religion. Upon the premisses of Butler's opponents much of the argument is good. But the mode of thought to which it is a reply has completely passed away. The writings of the English Deists, it must be remembered, were the real source of the French 'Illumination,' of the ideas of the Encyclopaedists. The mere negation of Deism exercised more influence on the Continent than in the British Isles. Voltaire was very much the kind of Deist whom Butler attacks. The Deism which can recognize so very personal a Deity as is implied in the sudden creation of man by a divine fiat, and yet scoffs at the notion of His benevolence or His justice, at the idea of moral obligation or of a future life, is practically non-existent at the present day. The tendency of modern philosophy is towards the opposite pole of religious thought: some form of Pantheism, not Deism, is now the alternative to the Christian conception of God. So far as the Deistic conception of God exists, it is among orthodox Christians who are often accused by philosophers of Deism on account of their too anthropomorphic conception of God and their too external a view of the relation between God and the world: but the Deism of the Voltarian type—the belief in a non-moral starter of a clockwork Universe—is an unknown variety of opinion, at least in cultivated and philosophical circles. You might possibly find something a little like it in the vague, inarticulate theological systems which lurk at the bottom of but slightly educated minds alienated from all recognized forms of religious thought

and yet not deliberately atheistic or agnostic. In meeting any higher level of non-theistic thought than this, Butler's formal argument is now completely unavailable. What Butler assumes as beyond the region of controversy is just what to modern doubters requires to be proved. Nevertheless it must not be supposed that the first part of the *Analogy* is worthless. It is a piece of very serious thinking. Much of Butler's line of thought is still valuable against the opposite tendency towards a non-moral, non-religious Pantheism. For a mind which has once accepted, or which is at least inclined to accept, the notion that the ultimate principle of things must be spiritual, the fundamental difficulty of accepting the Christian conception of God lies largely in the old problem of the existence of evil. At the present day anyone who is disposed to believe that the Universe may best be thought of in terms of Mind, will almost certainly be disposed to assume that, if God is the ultimate source or ground both of the physical Universe and of the human mind, He must be the source also of our moral ideas, and that therefore we are justified in attributing to Him those moral qualities which are approved by our moral consciousness, and to argue further that the purpose of the Universe must be one which commends itself to that moral consciousness. To put it more simply, those who are disposed to believe in God at all, will naturally feel impelled to think of Him as righteous, benevolent, loving. The great obstacle to such a belief now, quite as much as in Butler's day, is the existence of evil. If Theism cannot in some sense account for the existence of evil, either the modern man will reject the arguments which would otherwise incline him to the theistic view and fall back upon Agnosticism, or (if he is too much of a metaphysician to acquiesce in such intellectual bankruptcy) he will feel driven to believe in an Absolute—a universal Being who is thought of in some sense as spiritual, but not as personal or moral : he will declare that our moral distinctions do not exist from the point of view of the Absolute, that He or it (for some of the believers in a non-moral Absolute prefer to speak of this ultimate principle in the neuter) is 'beyond good and evil,' that the Absolute of Philosophy is not the God of Religion, and so will treat the whole Christian conception of God and His relation to the Universe either with

the hostility of a Nietzsche or with contemptuous patronage as a crude, childish, popular presentation of things—perhaps inevitable, perhaps useful, for emotional and devotional purposes, perhaps even as having a sort of intellectual justification at the level of popular thought but which cannot be seriously accepted as a representation of objective truth. And in dealing with this difficulty Butler may still give us some help. The most valuable and still living part of the *Analogy* is in the chapter on 'A State of Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement.' Although in the *Sermons* Butler was very much inclined to speak in the ordinary utilitarian way, to treat virtue as consisting certainly in the promotion of happiness practically identified with pleasure, in the *Analogy* he sees the difficulty of vindicating the ways of God to man on such a basis :

> 'Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour, otherwise than as such would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing but benevolence conducted by Wisdom. Now surely this ought not to be asserted unless it can be proved.'

Full as he still is of the eighteenth century respect for the cold pursuit of self-interest, he does now distinctly think of goodness as an end-in-itself, and at bottom he explains the presence of evil by the fact that it must be supposed in ways only partially intelligible to us to be a necessary means to the supreme purpose of creation, *i.e.*, the production of the greatest possible amount of human well-being—a well-being which includes the training and discipline of character as well as happiness.

The greatest *possible* amount. This logically implies a limit to the omnipotence of God, as popularly understood. If God can only secure His good ends by causing some evil, it is clear that He is not omnipotent in the popular sense of being able to do anything and everything that we take it into our heads to imagine. On the whole Butler recognizes this implication, though we could wish that he had done so a little more boldly. One of Butler's characteristic and ever-present thoughts is the ignorance of man—a thought so strongly held that it very seriously clips the wings of philosophical speculations, and might

have the unintended effect of driving a sceptically inclined reader into sheer agnosticism. But Butler has much to say against the irrationality of not following our reason as far as it will carry us because it will not carry us farther. He insists upon the fact that God governs the world through general laws —that we must not judge of each particular piece of divine action as if it had no relation to other acts: the world is a system or constitution in which every part is constructed with some reference to other parts. At the present day he would have called it an 'organic whole.' But this being so, we must suppose that 'there may be the wisest and best reasons why the world should be governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution [of happiness and misery] perhaps must follow' (p. 70). Among the consequences which would follow from a juster distribution of good and evil in this life would be that we could not foresee the consequences of our own acts, and as most of our enjoyments are such as 'we are, in some way or other, instrumental in procuring ourselves,' and 'this foresight could not be at all, were not the government of the world carried on by general laws': and 'to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in the nature of things' (p. 161). And then he explicitly recognizes that 'Perhaps (perhaps is a very favourite word with Butler) there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted with' (p. 41). It is presumptuous 'to imagine that the world might have been so constituted as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil' (p. 246). All this really implies that there is a limit to the omnipotence of God in the popular sense, and in the true sense if omnipotence is, in the words used by Thomas Aquinas, 'the power of doing *all possible* things.'

I may add that the impossibility of the true end of creation being secured without the permission of evil is largely dependent, in Butler's view, upon the necessity of free-will to virtue—a free-will which he interprets in the popular sense of indeterminism pushed to a point in which few modern philosophers would follow him. In dealing with this subject he shows absolutely no appreciation of the deterministic case. The idea of determinism or universal necessity is to Butler simply absurd.

Philosophers have differed, and perhaps will always differ, on this question; but a writer who thinks that determinism can be easily answered shows that he is not a philosopher of the first or even the second rank.

With all its defects, the argument of the first part is a deeply impressive piece of writing. It is when we come to the second part of the *Analogy*—the part which deals with Revelation—that we feel how completely the whole situation has changed since Butler's day. And indeed the greatest difference between Butler's position and any which could possibly be adopted at the present day by any philosophical mind lies in this hard and fast distinction between 'Natural' and 'Revealed Religion.' Butler assumes that all that he calls natural religion, all the knowledge which man can obtain by reason or reflection, all the knowledge that ever was gained, whether by ancient philosophers or by the prophets or the collective religious mind of religons other than the Jewish and the Christian, involved no sort of measure of revelation or self-communication of the Divine Mind at all. There is, indeed, one exception to this, for Butler was of course a great champion of Conscience, and he does recognize that Conscience is the will of God. But when he is contrasting Natural and Revealed Religion even this is commonly forgotten. On the other hand, when he turns to the Jewish and the Christian scriptures, he talks as if in their contents nothing whatever was due to the natural workings of the human minds, whether to any sort of intuition or any sort of reflection or inference—nothing, again, to the influence of religious or social emotion, of tradition or environment or any other of the forces which a modern philosopher would recognize as psychological causes, as distinct from logical reasons, for religious belief. He does not, indeed, formulate any strong theory as to the infallibility of scriptural writers on matters of fact, though he will never admit that they were actually mistaken; but as regards the religious content of their message—as regards the words of prophecy, for instance—he assumes that they were dictated by God in the most direct, the most external, apparently the most mechanical, manner conceivable. By revelation he means the direct communication of truth from the divine to the human mind under the guarantee of miracles. To a large extent

this supernatural communication of knowledge was a 'republication of the religion of Nature'—of the truths which, partly as the result of a supposed original revelation made in the infancy of the human race, and partly as the result of independent thought and reflection man might have discovered, and to some extent did discover, for himself by the use of his natural faculties—such truths as the existence and the goodness of God, the contents of the moral law, the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. But this Revelation did also contain the promulgation of new truths and new commands not otherwise discoverable—as, for instance, that duty of exterminating the Canaanites imposed upon the Israelites, or the necessity of faith and baptism for salvation revealed in the New Testament. Up to a point, he does indeed insist strongly upon the rights of Reason: he is very clear that we have no means of judging of the truth of anything whatever except by means of our Reason. Reason must judge of the fact that a revelation has been made, *i.e.*, that the alleged miracles in fact occurred, and that they prove the truth of all that was taught by any person by whom the miracle was wrought. And even so, no alleged matter of revelation could be accepted if it involved a contradiction or was opposed to some truth otherwise sanctioned by Reason or by Conscience. But practically this last admission is of very little value, because any particular command, no matter how shocking to the moral feelings of mankind or opposed to the general rule affirmed by Conscience, may nevertheless be a real command of God and must be obeyed. 'If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit, of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the case, or of the action.' But a particular act, no matter how much condemned by Conscience, may be commanded because in the particular case an exception to the principles of action approved by Conscience may in ways unknown to us be conducive to the ends of Divine Providence. For Samuel to have hated Agag we might suppose would have been wrong: but it was his duty to hew him in pieces before the Lord, loving him all the time. Moreover, Butler supposes 'men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God.' Consequently (the illustration is not Butler's; I

observe that he always tactfully refrains from illustrations) the Israelites were quite justified in cheating the Egyptians out of their jewellery, and in slaughtering the inhabitants of Canaan.

I need hardly say how completely this mode of thinking is opposed to the best religious thought, and the best religious instincts of the average Christian, at the present day. Butler was as coldly rationalistic—I use the word in a rather popular sense—as any of the Deists whom he opposed. In his mode of thinking, God never spoke to anyone but a Jew or a Christian of the first century. To suggest that something in the spirit of God moved in Socrates or in Gautama (though men like Justin or Origen would heartily have admitted it), or for Wesley to think of himself as divinely commissioned to take the world for his parish, would have to Butler been sheer 'enthusiasm.' Everything turns upon the evidence of miracles. Without miracles, no voice of God: when miracles can be appealed to, there is Revelation, no matter how improbable, absurd or immoral the particular matter revealed, if only it escape formal contradiction or opposition to the moral law as regards inward principle or motive. When he comes to the evidence for miracles, the tests which he proposes are of the most childishly inadequate description. If a miracle is recorded by a historian whom we have no positive reason to regard as dishonest, and we have no positive evidence against it, we must accept the statement. It is presumptuous, apparently, to ask when the writer lived, whether he had any means of knowing the truth, or whether his age was one in which there was a general disposition to accept miracles on little or no evidence. Butler's principles of historical evidence would compel him to accept all the miracles in Herodotus or in the *Acta Sanctorum*. He has no knowledge whatever as to the causes which tend to produce belief in miracles. The only causes he recognizes are enthusiasm or sheer lying. And enthusiasm is understood in a way which makes it hardly compatible with common sanity or common honesty. Butler has no conception of the way in which stories of miracles actually get believed and accepted by ancient chroniclers. He has no conception of the large extent to which so-called miracles, through the influence of mind on body in ways now obscurely understood, and many other events com-

monly called miraculous, may have actually occurred without any violation of the laws of nature. When miracles broke out in Butler's own diocese of Bristol, he sent for John Wesley. We are told little of that memorable interview between those typical representatives of the eighteenth century—the Bishop who represented the rationalism which had hitherto been dominant, and the Priest who represented the enthusiasm (as Butler would have called it) which was to usher in a new period in the history of religion. Butler's remark to Wesley is significant:

> 'Sir, the pretending to extraordinary revelations and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing—a very horrid thing.'

Such a way of dealing with the matter was entirely opposed to Butler's own canons of historical evidence. We are not told that he instituted any enquiry whatever into the truth of these reported cases. Because they could not be accounted for by the current accepted psychology and physiology of the day, they must be rejected without enquiry, and put down to 'enthusiasm' or dishonesty. Since enthusiasm, though a regrettable aberration of the human mind, could hardly be regarded as 'horrid,' we must presume that he accounted for them by imposture on the part of others, and perhaps by self-deception (such as that to which in one of his sermons he attributes the conduct of Balaam) on the part of John Wesley himself. If the miracle had been revealed as having happened a few hundred years after the event by an unknown writer who wrote in Hebrew, he would have regarded it as 'presumptuous' to question it. Butler could have given no rational account of the difference of his procedure in the two cases.

I have left myself hardly time to speak of Butler's *Fifteen Sermons* on Christian Ethics. And yet this is really his most important work. I have suggested that to put Butler's *Analogy* into the hands of the young student of theology is worse than useless. On the other hand, when I taught Moral Philosophy in Oxford, I always recommended men to begin by reading Butler's *Sermons*, or some of them, and Mill's *Utilitarianism* as the typical representation of the two classical schools of Moral Philosophy. Butler is the typical champion of the authority of Conscience—the typical 'Intuitionist.' In many respects Paley, though still essentially an eighteenth century theologian, was

much in advance of Butler: his ideas of historical evidence, for instance, are much better: but Butler's great superiority to him lies in the fact that he does recognize, as Paley does not, the authority of Conscience. The best part of the *Sermons*, indeed, is to my mind not so much the ethics proper as the psychology. His refutation of the hedonistic psychology of Hobbes—of the doctrine that every action is inspired by selfish or interested motives—represents a real advance in this region of thought. Even to this day it is hardly possible to point to anything better. His positive argument in favour of the existence and authority of Conscience is also powerful and convincing; but his conception of Conscience makes it too much of a piece of magic or miracle. He does not merely recognize that the idea of duty, the idea of right and wrong in general, is one of the fundamental categories of human thought, which can as little be explained by experience or the calculations of self-interest, or by mere emotions or by the mere influence of education and environment, as we can explain in such ways the genesis of our knowledge of the mathematical axioms or the laws of thought. He seems to think that every particular question of right or wrong has to be decided absolutely without any thought or calculation of consequences 'by almost any fair man under almost any circumstances' (the slight hesitation and reserve are very characteristic of Butler). In the development of the individual's ideas about right and wrong absolutely nothing is allowed for the influence of custom, tradition, environment, education. He supposes that, because our fundamental moral ideas are self-evident or intuitive, each and every individual can claim absolute infallibility for his own ideas of right and wrong in each particular case, and that the moral ideas of all fair men at all times in the world's history have always been the same. The only possible causes of wrong ethical judgments which he allows are superstition and 'self-deception,' which last is, as he says, no real exception. In Butler's time not so much was known as to the actual variations of the moral standard as in our own, but it is difficult to understand how such a view could have survived the reading of Homer and the Old Testament. Here again, as in his dealing with revelation, we have to notice an entire absence of the historical sense. He had no notion of evolution

or development, whether in the sphere of religion or of ethics. No doubt here the deficiencies of Butler's thoughts were largely those of his age—of the sceptic no less than the orthodox.

Butler is also inclined to assume that our moral judgments are quite independent of any calculation as to the social consequences of our actions. This is more conspicuously so in the title 'Truths on Virtue,' appended to the *Analogy*, than in the earlier *Sermons*. In the *Sermons* he is so far a utilitarian that he can say 'that there is a common end and interest of Society which each particular is bound to promote in the sum of morals.' But he seems to think that by a kind of pre-established harmony the judgments of Conscience will always coincide with the dictates of utility. In the Dissertation he is a more decided intuitionist, and contends that some acts are pronounced right or wrong by Conscience although it cannot be shown that they must necessarily increase happiness. He assumes (1) that if there is such a thing as Conscience the judgment of the individual is always infallible, and (2) that Conscience pronounces what particular course of action is right or wrong without any reference to its probable consequences. He assumes that our first intuitive, half-instinctive judgment upon the most complicated problem of conduct—prior to any reflection upon probable consequences—will be infallibly true. He is disposed to look upon Conscience as a sort of penny-in-the-slot machine. Not a moment's thought is necessary. Put in your question: out jumps the answer ready-made, complete, cut and dried. Here he is obviously wrong. In *some* cases it is obvious that we must think of the consequences of an action before we can pronounce it right or wrong. Whether this is so in all cases is still one of the most disputed points of moral philosophy. That is a question which it would take too long to discuss now. My own solution of the problem would be briefly this. I should myself be disposed to say that in all cases it is a duty to do what will best promote true human well-being, but that true human well-being does not mean the greatest possible proportion of pleasure. The Utilitarian is right in saying 'Acts are right in proportion as they promote universal good': he is wrong in thinking that universal good means universal pleasure. There are other goods besides pleasure, and pleasures differ in kind.

To ascertain what the consequences of an act are likely to be we must appeal to experience; but whether those consequences are truly good or not must be judged by the moral consciousness, or (as Butler would say) by Conscience, directly, immediately, intuitively. This is the true function of that faculty in every man which, in Butler's impressive language, 'distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly; and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and affirm its own.' It is not on the morality of particular acts detached from their consequences, but on the value of goods or ends of acts that it was the true function of Conscience to pronounce. Conscience is no less magisterial because for its effectual exercise we must enquire into what are the probable consequences of a proposed action and how far it will or will not tend to bring about that which conscience itself determines to be the true good, the true end or ideal, of human society. But I must not enter further into these questions of Moral Philosophy.

It is time for me to attempt to answer the question upon which I promised to say something—what light does a study of Butler throw upon the Apologetics which the needs of our day demand? I trust that question has been partly answered incidentally in the course of my criticism upon Butler. Lack of time forbids me to do more than summarise in a very hasty and dogmatic manner the lessons which I think we ought to learn from him.

(1) Butler was right in supposing that the special Theology of the Christian Religion presupposes a Natural Theology—a Theology which commends itself to the Reason and Conscience of man apart from the authority of Christ or of the Old and New Testaments. The first part of his *Analogy*—especially his whole view of life as a state of discipline—may help us to con-

struct that Natural Theology, though we shall have to begin by giving reasons for that belief in 'an intelligent author of Nature' which he for the most part assumes.

(2) We cannot in Butler's fashion draw a hard and fast distinction between Revealed Religion and Natural Religion. We shall have to recognize that there are degrees of Revelation. God can never be known to man except in so far as He reveals Himself. Revelation does not exclude the use of Reason. There is a measure of revelation in the teaching of ancient philosophers and of religions other than the Jewish or Christian; and, on the other hand, we cannot treat everything in the Old or New Testament as infallible truth. We shall look upon the religious history of the world as a progressive self-revelation of God to the human mind, culminating in the revelation through Christ—a revelation which requires to be itself developed and continued by the work of the Holy Spirit in human souls, and in particular in the society of Christ's followers.

(3) Whatever view we take of miracles, it is impossible to vest the claims of Christ and of Christianity wholly or even primarily upon the attestation of miracles. In the present state of criticism it is only when we have already accepted Christ as in a unique and supreme sense the Revelation of God that the question can even be raised whether the abnormal events which accompanied that life are attested by sufficient historical evidence, and whether, so far as that is so, they must be looked upon as actual interferences with the course of nature by the fiat of Divine power, or whether they may be regarded as extraordinary instances of a control of the processes of physical nature which, though in some sense abnormal, does not involve any interference with law. However we answer this question, the whole problem of miracles has become to us from an evidential point of view of secondary importance. The modern theologian, if he believes in miracles, will do so because he already believes in Christ. And he may still believe in Christ even if he does not believe in miracles. Those internal evidences of the truth of Christianity which the older Apologists were inclined to regard as secondary will become to us primary. The chief ground for our belief in Christ, and in the exceptional and unique Incarnation of God in Christ, must lie in the appeal

which His teaching makes to the reason, the conscience and the heart.

(4) Like Butler, or rather still more than Butler, we must put the appeal to authority of Conscience in the forefront of our Apologetic. There are many other lines of thought which lead up to the belief in what Butler calls an 'intelligent author of Nature,' though His relation to the world will be thought of in a way somewhat different from either the orthodox or the unorthodox Deists of the eighteenth century. But none of these lines of thought throws any light upon his character except the argument from Conscience. Our moral judgments supply the only valid ground for thinking of God as righteous, just, loving and, I may add, it is only by assuming that our moral judgments are as much a revelation of the ultimate nature of Reality as the judgments of Natural Science that we can justify the belief that because His ideal commends itself in a supreme way to the Conscience of Mankind, we may regard Christ as in a supreme sense the Revealer of God.

(5) This same authority of Conscience must be the chief ground of our belief in immortality. Butler was not wrong in the importance which he assigned to this belief, but we shall think of the future life somewhat differently from him. All eighteenth century Theology—Butler's included—strikes us as savouring too much of the Old Bailey. We need not scruple to think of the future life as a state of reward or punishment, but we shall avoid the eighteenth century tendency to look upon Religion chiefly as a powerful assistance to the police. We shall think of the highest life as something which begins here and now, as worth having for its own sake ('he that hath the Son hath life'): we shall set before men as their primary aim and object the promotion of the Kingdom of God in present human society, while we shall look forward to the future life as continuing the process of divine education for human character which is begun by the struggles and efforts, the joys and the sorrows, of the present.

MODERNISM AND THE YOUNG

By the Reverend L. C. Rowan-Robinson, M.B., Ch.B.,
Vicar of Brinsley, Notts

THE Church of late years has been faced with a great problem. Fully seventy per cent. of her Sunday School scholars disappear during the years of adolescence. We have the problem of large Sunday Schools and half-empty churches. No doubt more than one cause is at work here, but faulty and antiquated religious teaching is an important factor. There is no appeal to the developing intellect. Children are ready to use their minds: they love to use them, if their interest is aroused. They will grasp, and hold, and assimilate what appears to them reasonable. On the other hand many children, through being amenable to authority or in deference to the personal character of a teacher are pathetically willing to accept teaching which is unintelligible, obscure, or meaningless. The teaching given is often antiquated, divorced from real life, appearing to the child to deal with some strange sphere where the incredible is constantly happening. Yet the child must accept unthinkingly what it cannot understand. This is harmful spiritually and psychologically. Harmful spiritually because such teaching suggests that religion and reason have no connection. So the child's religion becomes unintelligent, ineffectual, and probably distasteful to the growing mind. Harmful psychologically because such a method is a reversal of the normal process by which the mind accepts an idea. Crichton Miller[1] tells us it is mentally injurious to endeavour to make people believe by 'faith' what appears to them incredible. We ought to accept or reject by a normal reasoning process; remembering, however, that the element of mystery is a natural and reasonable part of religion providing abundant scope for true faith. Yet the intellect should probe as far as it can. We know, however, that the older type of teaching is in vogue in many Sunday Schools and Day Schools. The Church, the Bible, the Prayer-Book says this or that, and you must accept it unthinkingly. Sometimes the Old Testament stories, and even the early chapters of

[1] *The New Psychology and the Preacher,* by Crichton Miller, M.D.

Genesis, are taught as actual facts, and the imperfect morality of the Old Testament not explained. So strange and even dreadful ideas of God develop in the minds of children, as many of us know from replies given to questions. Again, in answer to the question 'Why did Jesus come into the world?' we get at once the invariable reply, 'To save us from our sins.' In most cases the child has obviously no idea of the meaning of the phrase. Frequently there is little insistence on the bearing of religion on daily life, work, industry, history; and perhaps little attention to the missionary work of the Church. Old fashioned teaching of this kind is apt to be like the proverbial water on the duck's back. Instruction must stimulate thought then it really penetrates and becomes part of the personality.

What is the result of these wrong methods of instruction referred to? The results may be briefly described by the peculiar but expressive word 'Gospel-hardening.' The word explains itself to some extent. It describes the somewhat dreadful condition in which the young mind is almost proof against any further appeals of a religious nature. It is a real psychological barrier to the absorption of further religious teaching. The mind ceases to be receptive to ideas of that kind. This condition results from the constant repetition of half-understood theological phrases. A stage is reached when further spiritual tuition ceases to penetrate. Such is 'Gospel-hardening.' This phenomenon is, sad to relate, most frequent in the regular attendants at church and Sunday school, and in choir-boys. We can, I often think, make a rough guess as to what is passing through the boy's or girl's mind during the conventional teaching referred to. 'Yes, it is all very nice, very good. I don't know quite what he is talking about, but it is all in the Bible so it must be true. I wonder how long he is going on?' If not a well-disposed child, the internal language is considerably stronger. This mental resistance, when once established, creates a great difficulty. The young mind does not discriminate between good and bad religious teaching, but is indifferent to all. True, the difficulty may be overcome in time, but a radical change of method is required. An entirely new aspect of religion has to be presented, and then it is not always easy to arouse real interest. One is tempted at times to make startling an

somewhat exaggerated statements in order to rouse these young people from a state of polite (or obviously bored) indifference.

The tragedy comes later when the child leaves school and, during the years of adolescence, goes out to face the world. His or her religion is a rather garbled collection of half-understood theories. It is a severe shock to have to face even popular ideas about science, history, etc. These young people find they have been misled as to the accuracy of the Biblical record and other matters. It is terribly difficult for them to re-adjust their minds to the new knowledge. It may end in their throwing away the wheat with the chaff, and abandoning religion altogether. The serious results of our conventional religious teaching are not sufficiently realized. Some, however, are trying to deal with the situation. What are the remedies? The whole question is a difficult one, but a few points are here stated for consideration. One principle is becoming recognized to-day, that we should never teach children what is untrue. That holds good, for example, in matters of sex, and equally so in religion. On the other hand, in spiritual, as in secular, matters we need only attempt to impart that which can be fairly easily assimilated. The great essential is to teach from the beginning what can be retained throughout life. The quantity of facts will be increased as time goes on, but the general nature of the views imparted in early years should not have to be altered. It is dangerous if the young mind finds some loose stones of wrong teaching in the foundations of its fabric of spiritual knowledge. If not removed with great skill, and other stones carefully inserted, the whole edifice totters. The building of the great fabric of religious knowledge should be a continuous process from early years to old age, the walls rising steadily stone by stone, and the whole structure growing in beauty as the years pass.

Children do respond to modern teaching. It does not present difficulties to them; they welcome it and are often interested in such views. Adolescents especially like teaching which appeals to their minds, and is reasonable and not too dogmatic. Children seem readily to accept modern views of the Bible. Older boys and girls, brought up in traditionalism, are usually able to re-adjust their ideas if carefully taught. It is very important that this re-adjustment should be brought about by the

clergy or teachers; then all is well. All is far from well if th new ideas come from a scoffing fellow-worker in the factory!

So it is of vital importance to teach from the beginning faith which can be retained. With children a fully modern though constructive, view should be taught from early years Modernism is often much simpler than traditional religion. T refer very briefly to one example: Jesus dying 'to save us fro our sins' and 'pardon through the Precious Blood' mea scarcely anything to the average child (or, for that matter, t many adults). On the other hand, the Atonement as a marvel lous demonstration of God's love is intelligible and appealing to all. 'I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me.' Again it is important to connect religion with ordinary life. The recen Church Congress, with its message about the Eternal Spirit i Nature, science, and the mind of man, has reminded us tha there is no real separation between the material and the spirit ual; there is a sacramental value in all material things. So wit boys and girls the intimate connection of Christianity with indus try, science and nature must be stressed. Outlines of Churc history, so much bound up with the secular history which they are daily studying, will help considerably to make religion real Visits to our old churches and cathedrals will make such im pressions still more vivid. Then the connection with geography is easily established through the medium of missionary work No religious subject is easier to interest children in than th romance and adventure of missionary enterprise. The intimat connection of Church work abroad with the exploration o Central Africa, the study of the mission stations along the grea inland waterways of this vast continent, the thrilling stories o the great Christian pioneers, Livingstone, Mackay, and many others of the past and of to-day—these cannot fail to interes and to inspire. Here maps, pictures, models, etc., of cours help considerably. The growth of Christianity amongst nativ peoples is inseparable from racial questions, trade, economics government, imports and exports. We cannot, in fact, teac missions without to some extent teaching geography.

We have to try and give the boys and girls a large and in spiring vision of the world-wide Christian Church. We have t picture the Church's life as full of incident, and even o

romance and adventure. Examples can be taken from the work in the slums of great cities, on the prairies of Canada, in the tropical forests and swamps of Central Africa. If through our poor words they can catch some idea of the glory and greatness of the Church, of joy and adventure in the service of Christ, then much has been achieved. Lastly, and most importantly, let the young people come to know Jesus as He really was. Not the Jesus of the religious picture and stained-glass window—pale, sad, effeminate; but Jesus strong, alert, vigorous, with a certain joyousness about Him because in close touch with the Father, the source of power and peace and joy. Mr. Bruce Barton, in *The Man Nobody Knows*, helps us to understand the real Jesus and to pass on such knowledge to young people. If the outcome of the spiritual teaching given is a true, though very incomplete, idea of His life and character, there will be a strong desire to try and follow Him, the Friend of the young.

HOPE IN ACTION*

'By hope were we saved: but hope that is seen is not hope: for who hopeth for that which he seeth? But if we hope for that which we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.' *Rom.* viii, 24-25.

THIS is the word for word rendering in the Revised Version of the concluding sentences of the passage, so strangely modern in feeling, in which St. Paul has been speaking of the whole created world as looking forward to a glorious emancipation. The sense of the whole passage, as given in the terse summary of two great English scholars,[1] is as follows:

'What though the path to glory lies through suffering? The suffering and the glory alike are parts of a great cosmical movement, in which the irrational creation joins with man. As it shared the results of his fall, so also will it share in his redemption. Its pangs are pangs of a new birth. Like the mute creation, we Christians too wait painfully for our deliverance. Our attitude is one of hope and not of possession.'

And inasmuch as a mere verbal transcript of St. Paul's Greek seldom gives an adequate account of his meaning, let me

* A sermon preached in St. Edward's Church, Cambridge, Advent Sunday, 1926, by Sir Arthur F. Hort, Bart., M.A.

[1] Sanday and Headlam.

also quote the paraphrase by the same scholars of the last two sentences, which I have chosen for my text: 'Hope is the Christian's proper attitude. We were saved indeed, the groundwork of our salvation was laid, when we became Christians. But was that salvation in possession or in prospect? Certainly in prospect. Otherwise there would be no room for hope. For what a man sees already in his hand he does not hope for as if it were future. But in our case we do not see, and we do hope: therefore we also wait for our object with patient fortitude.' 'The point of these two verses,' the commentary from which I am quoting remarks, 'is that the attitude of hope, so distinctive of the Christian, implies that there is more in store for him than anything that is his already.'

It will be worth our while to try to determine rather more precisely what is this 'attitude of hope.' To begin with, what does St. Paul mean by saying that it was 'by hope' that we 'were saved'—that 'the groundwork of our salvation was laid'? With him it is at least more usual to say that we were saved by *Faith*,—Faith from the side of man, or Grace (that is, free gift) from the side of God. And, though it is not necessary to draw a hard and fast line between Faith and Hope, it is clear that he does distinguish them, and so it will be better to take the rendering preferred by many translators: '*In* hope were we saved,' and the difference that this will make may be given thus. In St. Paul's language Faith refers to the original act of accepting Christ, and 'belongs essentially to the past, and to the present as growing directly out of the past,' while when he is looking to the future, in his own words 'reaching forward to the things that are before,' he uses the word Hope.

This is surely no mere verbal subtlety. What I am concerned to maintain is that with St. Paul Hope is a distinct virtue, or at least that we may gain something by isolating it, as it were, from the other Christian virtues with which it is indissolubly connected. We may then perhaps more easily come to see some of its implications and its practical applications. But we have not yet quite done with the word itself as used in certain salient passages of the New Testament. St. Paul's pupil, the writer to the Hebrews, does not draw the line between Faith and Hope just where St. Paul draws it: Faith, he says, is the assurance of

things hoped for, that is, the guarantee that what we hope for is not a delusion. But whereas with this writer Faith means trust in the promises of God, with his master it has, as we have seen, a more specialized sense and means the single decisive act of the man who makes up his mind to accept the revelation of God in Christ. Perhaps we might say that, whereas with the writer to the Hebrews Faith and Hope are hardly distinguished except so far that Faith means *confident* Hope, *assured* Hope, with St. Paul Faith is the conviction out of which Hope springs, without which Hope would be but a baseless aspiration.

Again, without this distinction we can hardly understand the famous rhapsody in I *Cor.* at the close of which St. Paul links Hope with Faith and Love as one of the triad of Christian virtues. At first sight it may seem a little strange that Hope, which, as we ordinarily use the word, means, I suppose, a cheerful attitude towards the future, should rank with Faith, which is the very core of religion, and with Love, which is religion in action. It is true that, in the climax of the stately hymn of Love St. Paul exalts that virtue above the other two members of the triad : but it remains true that he has put the three on the same level, and, if he so far corrects himself as to give Love the pre-eminence, is it not because Love is the crown of the others? Faith is the ground of Hope, as we have seen, and both find in Love their consummation. If Faith and Hope do not issue in Love, we have but a selfish, unsocial religion, a religion unworthy of the name : wherefore Love, as the completion of the inseparable triad, is 'greater than' these others.

It is by this time clear that, with St. Paul at least, each of these three words has a pretty definite yet by no means a restricted sense. Faith is of course far more than an intellectual attitude : it includes such ideas as we denote by the moral terms loyalty or devotion. Love, as the great hymn has set forth, is no mere emotion, but a principle dominating all conduct in matters small and great. Both are active forces utterly transforming the life lived in obedience to them. Must we not then, if we are to do justice to this great thinker, give to Hope also a scope correspondingly wide? It must mean, not just a disposition to look on the brighter side of things, to say, with the old Greek proverb, 'Perhaps to-morrow things will be

better' : it will stand for something which is capable of becoming a great moral force. Not, of course, that St. Paul meant his three virtues to be mutually exclusive : far from it, they form an overlapping series : the life which is motived by the three will be full of Hope, because it is grounded in Faith, and its Faith and Hope will find themselves in works of Love. He has drawn for us an immortal picture of Love in action : and if, in his controversy with the old Jewish view that a man can purchase salvation by what he does, he contrasts Faith with works —that is, the supposed meritorious works of the Jewish religion —the Faith of which he spoke was nevertheless Faith in action, the Faith which implies a devoted life while claiming no merit for its devotion. So also Hope (and this is the conclusion to which we have been working up) must, to correspond with its associates, mean Hope in action, Hope inspiring life—something more positive, more dynamic than, for instance, the somewhat forlorn hope of Watts's familiar picture, striving to get music out of the last unbroken string of his lute. That conception indeed represents one aspect of Hope, what we may call the negative aspect, Hope which refuses to yield to despair : but it is far from the more virile conception of St. Paul.

Now is anything more needed by the present distracted and disillusioned age than the Hope of which the sanguine apostle speaks, a Hope which on the one hand waits 'with patient fortitude' for its realization, but which on the other hand, since it is grounded in Faith and finds itself in Love, is, to adapt Milton's immortal sentence, no 'fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed,' but girds up its loins for 'the race where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat'? We have need of prophets, men of far-reaching vision, not blind to the perplexities of the present, yet brave in their forecast of the coming days, to brace us with the serenity of their outlook, reading, like the old Hebrew seers, the duties of the present and the aspirations of the future from the lessons of the past—such seers as the two great statesman-prophets whose works form the greater part of the book of Isaiah; the prophet of the Fall of Jerusalem, who put pluck into Hezekiah : and his people when the extinction, at least the temporary extinction, of the nation was certain; and the second Isaiah (if that was his

name) who, when his countrymen had long acquiesced in captivity, would not have them sit down and weep by the waters of Babylon, but raised them with the clarion of hope to work out their deliverance, confident that in the home-trek across the dangerous desert they would find the crooked made straight and the rough places plain. At this season we listen, most fittingly, each year to his buoyant proclamation, and never surely was there a time when it should meet with a readier response. In the first Isaiah's message of Hope the note of patient fortitude is dominant, as it is in that passage of St. Paul which I read as my text: the second Isaiah rises to that more energetic conception which we have seen must have been in St. Paul's thought when he made Hope the connecting link between Faith and Love, and which I have ventured to call 'Hope in action.' We cannot dispense with either aspect: the one is complementary to the other. There must be patient waiting, and there must also be pressing forward, and this is no paradox or inconsistency: as the second Isaiah bids, we must—to translate him into Christian terms—throw ourselves actively into the work of the Kingdom, while, with the first, we find our strength in quietness and confidence if the Kingdom does not seem to come much nearer in our time.

In attempting one or two applications of the Pauline doctrine of Hope, I venture to leave on one side the individual aspect of it and to speak only of the social. Not that the hope of individual salvation is not part of the Christian evangel: but in the passage from which my text is taken St. Paul is taking a wider view, he is looking forward to nothing less than the salvation of the whole created world, its deliverance, to give his own metaphor, 'from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.' So also in the great passage to which I have also referred, where he adumbrates the connexion of Hope with Faith and with Love, the outlook implied is no less wide: he is not asking how a man may save his own soul, but with what virtues he must be equipped for the service of his fellows and the promotion of the cause of God. Nor, happily, in these days is an apology needed for emphasizing the social rather than the individual side of religion: if anything, the danger is rather lest individual or personal religion should

receive less than its due consideration. Amid much that is disturbing and perplexing in the present state of the churches there is at least one encouraging sign : it seems now almost universally agreed that the gospel is a social gospel. Yet some of us can remember the time when this point of view was put forward almost as a paradox : the 'social interpretation' of Christianity for which Maurice—a name to be revered within these walls—laboured with prophetic zeal, and for which, only a generation ago, Westcott nobly wrote and spoke and strove, here in Cambridge and afterwards in his northern diocese, has now become almost an accepted axiom. There may be, indeed there is, a wide difference of opinion as to the possibility or the wisdom of bringing Christian principles directly to bear on the economic relations between man and man or the political relations between state and state : yet few who are in any sense Christian, few even of the men of goodwill who do not claim that name, doubt that, the more Christian men become, the better will it be in the long run alike for the nation and for the commonwealth of nations.

Hence, in urging the claim of one Christian virtue, Hope, I have no new or unfamiliar doctrine to put forward : I can but recall attention to a feature of the Christian ethic which does not always perhaps receive adequate recognition. No Christian doubts that Faith, however he understands the term, is the essential foundation, nor that Love is the motive power of all religious endeavour : but it may be that Hope, which St. Paul seems to have made the link between the two, is apt, at times when discouragement is natural, to remain in abeyance. At such times we are likely to forget, or too seldom to remember, that 'patient fortitude' is one side of it, what we may call its passive side; perhaps also to forget that, on its active side, it is the inspiration of the eager and enterprising spirit.

To read the signs of the times and from them to forecast the future needs more courage than is given to most, and more knowledge than anyone can claim. But at least one of the clamant needs of our time can be discerned by the most ordinary observer : with most it is almost a commonplace, it is doubted only by a perverse minority, that, if the civilized world is to get back to where it stood before the great cataclysm, still more if

it is to advance further, it requires above all things Peace—peace between classes and peace between nations. As to the first, it is extremely difficult to estimate whether on the whole we are moving on the right road, so many and so serious are the set-backs. On the one hand we see abundant signs of a more fraternal spirit between master and man, and more than one influential organization working to that end : on the other hand we hear the class-war preached as a gospel. One thing however is surely beyond dispute : in our own nation at least never at any period of our history were there so many people seeking social peace and ensuing it with all their might. Read in such a book as Mr. Trevelyan's recent sketch of our island story the record of the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, and you cannot doubt that, despite the all too patent facts which point to a less optimistic conclusion, the men of goodwill form a larger, a more active and a more effective proportion of the whole body than ever they did before. That is my deliberate conviction, even at the close of a year which has seen an industrial quarrel of unprecedented length. Why then is the Peace which so many desire so slow to come? An eminent economist recently asked the pertinent question, what would happen in industry if the Christian principle of altruism came to be universally accepted and acted on? And the Bishop of Durham, an acute if unpopular critic of panaceas too hastily swallowed, has criticized in the same sense the well-meant efforts of such bodies as the Industrial Christian Fellowship and C.O.P.E.C. The answer to such criticisms is one which the critics themselves would perhaps accept, namely, that we must add to our virtue knowledge, knowledge of historical and economic facts, knowledge also of men and the understanding which enables one man to look at things with the eyes of another. We cannot here separate the moral and the intellectual faculties : the clearer mind, in this regard at least, goes along with the more sympathetic heart.

> Hate and mistrust are the children of blindness,—
> Could we but see one another, 'twere well !
> Knowledge is sympathy, charity, kindness,
> Ignorance only is maker of hell.

We are told that for the solution of our industrial troubles what is wanted is more Christianity. Of that there can be no

question : but—such at least seems to me to be the lesson of the criticisms to which I have referred—we must beware lest our conception of Christianity be too narrow : it must include clear thinking as well as a brotherly spirit. The better developed a man is, in mind as well as in body and spirit, the better Christian will he make, since he will come nearer to what God intended him to be. Let us not shrink from recognizing that to develop the minds which He has given us is part of religion : our Lord counted 'foolishness' among the things which 'defile a man.' A vast deal of the trouble in the world comes, we must admit, more from confused thinking than from moral perversity. More knowledge means more education. Education seems sometimes to lead only to muddled thinking, and we are tempted to say that it is better not to think at all. But the mischief lies in *half*-education : there is wisdom in the trite saying 'A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.'

This is not a digression from our proper subject, 'Hope in action.' Education is a long process, and it is just here that St. Paul's conception of Hope will help us. Do we not all tend to take too short views? We do not usually think much beyond our own generation, whereas in this all-important matter of education—a word in itself of no very inspiring sound—we need to think generations ahead. We have to learn to wait with 'patient fortitude,' but this waiting does not mean sitting with folded hands : there is also the active side of Hope, the strenuous confronting of immediate difficulties, the submission to the drudgery of details, in the confidence founded on Faith and issuing in loving devotion that our children or our grandchildren *aut qui nascentur ab illis* will have a clearer vision of things and of men, and so, working with better understanding, and not less but more goodwill, will bring the brotherhood of man nearer than we can ever hope to see it. An old schoolmaster may be pardoned for grumbling at the general indifference to education. I am not suggesting that all should be teachers : I am maintaining that education is the concern of all, that, for instance, if parents send their children to school because they can hardly help it, but have themselves taken no part in their previous training, and hardly seem to care what they learn at school or why they learn it, they are neglecting their first duty to the race.

Again, Peace between nations is the imperative need of our time: here again it may help us to consider what should be the attitude of Christian Hope. Far be it from me to suggest that the prospect is other than encouraging: it is indeed, I verily believe, far brighter than seemed possible eight years ago, or even one year ago. Yet there is danger in a too facile optimism: here again Hope calls us to unremitting and confident endeavour with patient waiting for results. The idea of co-operation between nations, which involves the belief that the elimination of war is within the range of practical politics, is still new; while such opposed ideas as that one's own nation can do no wrong, or that man is a fighting animal, have held ground in the human mind from time immemorial. Hence a too sudden reversal of old-established convictions might well prove not to be permanent. Here again we have to look generations ahead for the triumph of the new order, and meanwhile here too we must rely chiefly on education. And this education will depend not merely on the formal teaching of more enlightened views of citizenship: the most important lessons are learnt subconsciously, drunk in, as it were, from the atmosphere. That atmosphere has to be slowly and surely created. We older ones, especially those who are parents, can see to it that, in the instruction of the home, and of the schools as far as we can influence them, the next generation imbibes as naturally the principles which lead to the true patriotism as our forefathers, and perhaps we ourselves, imbibed those of a narrower creed. It should in time become as *natural* to believe in fellowship between nations as it has hitherto been to believe in mutual jealousy and fear as the normal attitude of states to one another. And here too as in the matter of industrial co-operation, moral cannot be divorced from intellectual education: the cool head is as essential as the warm heart.

Is it fanciful thus to interpret St. Paul's words about Hope in relation to the great problems of to-day—confident endeavour, since Hope cannot be disjoined from Faith, with patient waiting for the world to become better and wiser, since Hope is 'for things which we see not'?

> 'Tarry thou the Lord's leisure: be strong,
> And He shall comfort thy heart.'

BOOK REVIEWS

CRITICAL CATHOLICISM*

The authors of this volume of essays attempt a fresh exposition and defence of the Catholic faith. In the result, defence is the more evident. The book is not a *summa theologiae*, and in spite of its bulk contains little that is new. It is none the less a notable work. A real effort has been made to give it an unity which composite volumes so often lack, and the effort has been successful. But its main importance is that of which its title is indicative. The authors are definitely Anglo-Catholic scholars, yet all would acknowledge what one of their number explicitly states, that one of the main objections nowadays felt against institutional religion is due to the fact that the modern man has come to confound orthodoxy with obscurantism, and to regard the Catholic Church as a foe to intellectual freedom and to the discovery of truth. Their work testifies to the acceptance of Modernist principles, if not of what are regarded as Modernist views, in circles wherein even Modernists are apt to deny their existence; the temper and tone of every essay is generous to a degree unusual in a theological work which is of necessity largely controversial; there is a truly liberal readiness to acknowledge, even to emphasize, what the writers believe to be of value in views which they criticize and from which they dissent. Whatever disagreement may be felt with certain of the positions they maintain, any charges of obscurantism would here be ridiculous; they will only be made by such as are themselves oppressed by a double portion of that spirit.

Inevitably we begin with an anthropological essay. The beginnings of Anglo-Catholicism are apparently to be found in the Stone Age. From this venerable date Dr. E. O. James traces the emergence of religion down to the realization of monotheistic faith in Israel and in Greece. He gives an able and interesting summary of a familiar story. The ancient origin of religion being thus established, Professor A. E. Taylor undertakes its vindication. His contribution is a valuable addition to the literature of theism. For the purpose of his essay, he is not disposed to attach great importance to the information afforded by psychology or anthropology. Most of what is of greatest significance for the poet, biographer or historian falls outside the purview of the scientific psychologist and the anthropologist. These afford information valuable as far as it goes, which is, however, not very far. Prof. Taylor shows, with admirable lucidity, how an inferential knowledge of God can be reached from the data supplied by physical nature and the moral consciousness. Nature does not explain itself. Whether we begin with its variety or with its uniformity, and attempt to see any reason at all for either, we can see it only outside Nature, in the supernatural. Laws only explain Nature as it now is if we assume, as something needing no explanation, that Nature was in such and such a condition at a given date in the past. But its past condition stands as much in need of explanation as its present condition. The issue of this cosmological argument is that unless we are to be content to regard Nature as an unintelligible mystery we must think of it as dependent on some Reality which transcends it. Again, a probability that certain consequences of well-being, whether for oneself or for others, will follow certain actions, is altogether insufficient as an explanation of the absolute obligation felt

* *Essays Catholic and Critical.* By Members of the Anglican Communion. Edited by E. G. Selwyn. (S.P.C.K. 1926. Price 10/6 net.). Pp. 452.

by the moral consciousness. For every man there is a point at which he 'draws the line,' and says, 'This thing I will not do, whatever the cost may be to myself or to anyone else or to everyone.' The obligation wholly independent of temporal consequences cannot have its justification in the temporal. 'Only to a being who has in his structure the adaptation to the eternal can you significantly say, "You ought."' 'If Nature shows us only the footsteps of God, in man as a moral being we see His image.' In considering the testimony of religious experience, Professor Taylor sets the standard which, with the exception of a few ambiguities, is adopted throughout the book. He does not discredit the appeal by over-crediting it. There is no suggestion that it delivers us from the need of a rational theology, or any attempt to make the supposedly pragmatic value of religious experience the substitute for the truth of the doctrines with which it is bound up. It affords the most direct, but not the only, way of access to God. Interpretation of religious experience may be defective, and man may be moved to adoration by an inadequate or unworthy object; there are aberrations of religion as there are mistakes of sense perception, but neither type of experience is thereby proved illusory. We do not know of any other short statement and defence of theism which is comparable to that which Professor Taylor has given us in this essay.

If subject-matter had been made the criterion by which to decide the order of the contributions to this volume, Fr. Thornton's essay on 'The Christian conception of God' would have followed next. He accepts Prof. Taylor's conclusions and takes up his parable, which has suffered an unnecessary interruption by the interposition of two essays on Authority. Fr. Thornton divides his subject into (*a*) The Attributes of God, and (*b*) The Holy Trinity. He does not give us a metaphysical analysis of the technical terms in which the attributes of God have been traditionally symbolized. They are negative, but their meaning for us is not simply negative. 'They are symbols of God's greatness and our smallness.' The religious impulse can find satisfaction only in a God who is the ground of all forms of our experience, emotional, moral, and rational. The past has a warning for the present in so far as it has attempted to define God exclusively in the terms of one dominant idea. To a completely synthetic account of what God has revealed Himself to be we can never attain. The majesty of God and His willingness to enter into intimate relations with His creatures is characteristic of the whole of revelation, and is a principle of which the Incarnation is the final ratification. We are acclimatized to the idea of grades in the structure of reality. Revelation also has come in four stages —through Nature, in Man, in History and in the Incarnation. Further, the dualism of subject and object in knowledge cannot be eliminated. At every step in the revelation of God we have real knowledge, yet in such a way that our knowledge is never complete, though it is sufficient for a further advance. The more we are at home in the world the more strange and mysterious it is to us. So with our knowledge of God. All that man can know of God was projected into human life in the Person of Christ. But revelation requires inspiration as its counterpart; 'Since what is given in revelation is from a supernatural source, man stands in need of Divine assistance or grace from the same supernatural source, that he may be able to apprehend what is revealed.' This, man has received by the gift of the Spirit, an interior presence which was, by the earliest Christians, traced to the Incarnate Lord. It is unfortunate that the New Testament evidence that this interior presence was thought of as itself personal, or that it was regarded as distinct from the Christ who dwells in the heart by faith,

should be dealt with in a footnote of three lines. St. Paul could speak of *Christ* dwelling in him, and of Christ as 'forming himself' in Christians. In any case, the difficulty which attends the theory that man needs inspiration by a third personal influence to enable him to apprehend the revelation of Christ, is that we can see no reason why man should be amenable to the operations of this third divine influence but not to that which in the Incarnation is made known to him in terms of his own humanity. Fr. Thornton admits that there is no formulated Trinitarian doctrine in the New Testament. He accepts Professor Taylor's suggestion that the doctrine can best be expressed in modern language in the phrase 'three centres of activity,' or in Bishop Temple's 'three centres of one consciousness.' Reason, he says, is primarily concerned with the unity of God, experience with the distinctions. In man the individual and social aspects of personality are in tension and conflict: the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is an attempt to express the truth that in God they exist in an unity and harmony which transcend all analogies from human experience. Whatever relationship exists in God is not that of three individuals.

Sir Edwyn Hoskyns writes on 'The Christ of the Synoptic Gospels.' He gives a very fair summary of the Liberal Protestant view of Jesus, His teaching, and the development of Catholicism. Catholic Modernism, partly accepting this reconstruction, glories in a development which Liberal Protestantism deplores. He proceeds to summarize the generally accepted view of the literary structure of the Gospels, and formulates some canons of historical criticism. Some of these are obvious common sense; others are one-sided. For example, it is true that if a story contains matter that is normal and human, and also records supernatural events, it does not follow 'that what is supernatural has been superimposed by the irrational credulity of later enthusiastic believers.' True: but the case is different if, as is often the fact, such a story, as compared with an earlier one of which it is an alternative version, not only adds supernatural elements but also suppresses normal and human ones. Because presuppositions are dangerous guides, is there no such thing as historical probability? The main theme of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' essay is that there are certain ideas underlying the Synoptic tradition. These ideas are of the nature of contrasts and have not been correctly formulated. He holds, *e.g.*, that 'the contrast is not between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, but between the Christ humiliated and the Christ returning in glory; the two being held together by the title "Son of Man" which suggests both.' The author does not claim more for his essay than that it is a step towards a much to be desired synthesis of the series of contrasts which he believes a genuinely historical study of the Gospels to reveal. It is indeed true that much more will have to be done than is attempted in this essay by way of showing that the terms of the contrasts are equally historical.

The Incarnation is dealt with by Dr. Mozley, who is chiefly concerned to defend the Chalcedonian formula from modern attack. He is not wholly satisfied with it, except in the rather negative sense that he knows no better. If the Church was right in ascribing to Jesus an unique relation to God and man, he thinks she is likely to be right in the further belief which makes her faith a coherent unity; and he thinks that the Chalcedonian definition, its difficulties notwithstanding, tends to preserve that faith and its consequent experience. He fears that suggested alternatives endanger both. Moreover, they either involve greater difficulties or else are inadequate to cover the facts, and they do not seem able to rise above description to explanation. He holds very strongly, and we think rightly, that the

ideas of immanence and incarnation, as used in attempts to formulate a doctrine of Christ's person, are not two theological ways of expressing the same thing. We suggest that a remark of Fr. Thornton's gives a clue to the opposition which exists between them. Fr. Thornton says that Christ 'stands in an historical succession; He cannot be explained from within it.' Now if Christ stands in an historical succession, philosophy must attempt to explain him as from within it, that is to say, in terms of immanence. If it cannot do so, then we must fall back on the *muthos* of the Incarnation as the only alternative to the admission of inexplicable mystery. But the terminology of the *muthos*, if treated with strict philosophical precision, will soon land us in absurdities, as logical deductions from the Nicean formula very easily do. The contrast which Dr. Mozley finds is, we think, not so much between the ideas of immanence and incarnation, as between immanence and *the* Incarnation. The one can be developed into a consistent philosophy: the other, by reason of its uniqueness, is incapable of philosophical rationalization.

One of the most interesting essays is that by Mr. Selwyn on the Resurrection. He notes that the Creed states the fact of our Lord's resurrection, but lays down nothing as to the manner of it. The theory he advocates is that the recorded appearances of the risen Master belong to the order of mystical visions, and it is a sign of the times and of the movement of English theological thought that whereas in 1912 Canon Streeter's very similar theory involved him in a storm of denunciation, Mr. Selwyn—though we doubt if his views will commend themselves to the majority of Anglo-Catholics for some time to come—has not been accused of heresy by even the straitest sect of Anglo-Catholicism. Former versions of the vision theory, whether of the 'subjective' or of the 'objective' type, are discarded as implying a distinction which has no warrant either from psychology or from philosophy; what is seen, be it dream, hallucination, or mystical insight, is always an 'object.' The question is of its reality or its unreality. Validity depends on its harmony with the truest and most valued convictions and experiences of the conscious life, and on its effect, particularly on character and life. Mr. Selwyn thinks the visions of the risen Lord satisfy these tests of validity. They are veridical. But Mr. Selwyn feels the limitations of his theory. The view of the appearances as veridical mystical visions implies that they are but confirmatory of a fact which must otherwise be established. His theory may be open to objections, but we are surprised that Dr. Goudge should have criticized it on the ground of the difficulty of seeing how visions can prove facts not otherwise known; for Mr. Selwyn clearly states that the disciples' belief in the Resurrection 'rested in the first instance upon a number of converging lines of evidence, none of which by itself was convincing,' and he believes that the empty tomb rather than the visions was the decisive factor in the formation of their faith. It is the empty tomb, says Mr. Selwyn, which is the great pledge that death has been *conquered*: the visions at the most show only that Jesus *survived* death. The distinction is clearer to Mr. Selwyn than it is to us, but at any rate it should deliver him from a criticism which, for its validity, depends on the absence of such a distinction. On any view of the nature of the resurrection appearances, the resurrection faith implies, as Mr. Selwyn says, an occurrence in the historical order of some fact of transcendent significance touching Jesus Christ. His theory of the nature of the appearances economises difficulties in respect of the *immediate* historical evidence which, in any case, is by itself inadequate to establish the fact to which it testifies.

Mr. Milner White's essay on 'The Spirit of the Church in History' shares with Professor Taylor's article the great merit that it should appeal to a much wider circle than Church of England readers. It deserves the attention of those who own no ecclesiastical allegiance. It is very attractively written. He is thoroughly justified in claiming that the brunt of the difficulties of reinterpretation occasioned by new knowledge has fallen on the Church of England. 'The work of the Church of England through the scientific and critical revolution has been at least of an importance sufficient to justify at the bar of history her position in temporary separation from her fellow communions of East and West. She has done for the Catholic Church that which Rome was not free to do, and which the East was too far removed from the centre of modern thinking to comprehend.'

Dr. Bicknell and Dr. Mozley offer restatements of the doctrines of Sin and the Fall, and of Grace and Freedom. Dr. Kirk undertakes the same task in respect of the Atonement. Much that he has to say is attractive, and he very generously recognizes the value in the 'exemplarist' theories which he criticizes. If Dr. Rashdall were still in the flesh he would be amazed and not a little outraged to find his theory of the Atonement criticized on the ground that it implies that the man who benefits most by the example of the death of Christ is the man most highly endowed with the capacity for emotional quickening. Dr. Kirk endeavours to reinterpret the vocabulary of the Atonement; it is a formidable task, but by some tortuous exegesis we are enabled to use the word 'satisfaction' as signifying not an 'adequate compensation' to God, still less to an angry God, 'but rather a "suitable acknowledgment" thereof, and a pledge of newness of life.' Whatever value this sort of reinterpretation may have for theologians, for ordinary teaching purposes and in Christian worship there is great danger of unreality and disastrous misunderstanding attaching to the continued use of words which, understood in their plain and natural, not to say their traditional, sense are a moral offence. Must we for ever approach God with phrases which really do not mean what they appear to say?

There are two essays on the Sacraments, and both are valuable. Several references to that by Mr. Williams will be found in the last Conference Number of *The Modern Churchman*. It is a masterly piece of work, and brilliantly written. If at certain points Mr. Williams has unnecessarily exposed himself to attack by his very obvious desire for an absolutely logical coherence in evidence drawn from a period of great and rapid development, and by reason of the large speculative element in his interpretation of history, this does not impair the validity of his main contentions. He has written quite the best refutation of the hypothesis that a primitive non-sacramental Christianity was, within the period of the New Testament, transformed into a 'mystery-cult' by the assimilation of the Galilean Gospel to the Hellenistic mystery religions. His contention will stand even if we think the evidence demands our acknowledgment that St. Paul may have found in the language of those religions a medium for the expression of similar needs and their satisfaction to those satisfied by the mysteries. Mr. Spens' exposition of Eucharistic theology will appear extremely far-fetched to those who regard the view of sacrifice which it implies as no longer possessing any intelligible meaning. To others it will probably make a strong appeal. In view of the place which Eucharistic worship now holds in the English Church, all should welcome any attempt to provide a rational theology of the Eucharist which is free from all connotation of materialism. Mr. Spens is conscious of the danger of superstí-

tion consequent upon inadequate teaching, and of the fact that certain forms of devotion, which in themselves he would judge to be good, may easily be exaggerated so as to disturb the proportion of the faith.

There remains the fundamental problem of Authority. Dr. Rawlinson deals with authority as a ground of the acceptance of particular doctrines or historical assertions as true. The question is the ultimate relation between authority and truth. The doctrine of Papal infallibility is explicitly rejected. 'The rejection of the claim of the Roman Church to be possessed of authority in the form of what I have ventured to describe as an external and oracular guarantee of the intellectual truth of its doctrines carries with it, in the long run, the rejection of the purely oracular conception of religious authority altogether.' Differing from some older Anglo-Catholics, Dr. Rawlinson holds that authority in this sense cannot be predicated of Œcumenical Councils or Creeds if it is rejected in the case of the Pope. The final appeal must be *'verifiable at the three-fold bar of history, reason, and spiritual experience.'* The wisdom of the individual lies in a deference to the community, and this confidence is justified in proportion as the Church makes an essentially rational appeal. Morover, the rational authority of the broad doctrinal tradition of orthodox Christianity is proportionate 'to the extent to which it can be said to represent the conclusions of a genuinely free consensus of competent and adequately Christian minds,' and in inverse proportion to the extent to which it is secured by discipline. The phrase 'adequately Christian minds' involves us in a circle, since presumably only those can be so regarded who accept the 'broad doctrinal tradition of orthodox Christianity,' some apparently fundamental doctrine of which may from time to time appear to be threatened. But Dr. Rawlinson's general position is abundantly clear. It is acceptable to any Modernist. The use of ecclesiastical terminology may seem to disguise the fact, but Dr. Rawlinson's idea of authority is not other than that which would be found in any scientific society. It does not amount to more than a reasonable deference to those who are presumed, on reasonable grounds, to know best.

Mr. Wilfrid Knox' conception of authority is essentially democratic. So far as is possible the appeal must be 'to the whole body of the faithful, in all places and in all generations.' However difficult it may be to discover what, on this appeal, is 'of faith,' Mr. Knox is clear that the appeal must not be to the religious consciousness of a few individuals, however eminent they may be in respect of sanctity or learning. Apparently both sanctity and learning must be brought to the level of the mass if we are to attain to the truth. On the fundamental issue, Mr. Knox stands absolutely with Dr. Rawlinson. 'In fact the mere nature of the authority which utters a decision, whether Pope or Council, is by itself of no value as a test of infallibility. The measure of truth which any pronouncement can claim is to be tested by the extent to which, after its promulgation, it commends itself to the authority it claims to represent.' Now whatever may be thought of this conception of authority one thing about it is transparently obvious. That the truth of an official pronouncement can only be seen when it has won the approval of the private judgments of those for whose guidance it is made, is as flatly opposed to the conception of authority held by the rest of the Catholic Church as anything could be. Only the ambiguities with which history and controversy have endowed the word Catholic give an apparent justification for these authors' claim that their conception of authority is Catholic. It is not strange that Roman Catholics should accuse the contributors to this volume of 'Modernism.' There is truth in

the charge; for their book is a very useful apology (in the best sense of the term) for a really liberal Catholicism. Here we see Anglo-Catholicism at its best, and by its best it should be judged. J. S. BEZZANT.

THE APOSTOLIC MESSAGE.*

Dr. Bacon sets out to establish by historical enquiry the primitive Apostolic Message, 'how the Gospel was originally understood,' 'what it comprised,' and also 'to study the elemental group of Gospel Material, so as to discover the development of the Message in its varied forms.' He begins with contrasting in striking colours the teaching of St. Paul and St. Luke. He says that St. Luke 'throughout omits the forgiveness of sins through the blood of the Cross,' and that he never affirms that Christ died 'for our sins.' In his writings Jesus was Christ in spite of (and not as in St. Paul, because of) the Cross. Even in his account of the Last Supper he eliminates this aspect, and 'presents an interpretation of the farewell Supper, which seems completely devoid of that element which Paul always makes central.' 'His writings embody sources quite at the opposite pole from Paul; in particular they present a doctrine of salvation in which the vicarious suffering of Jesus plays no part whatever.' His is a 'non-Pauline, not to say anti-Pauline point of view.'

The author is careful to distinguish on many points the Lukan material borrowed from Mark, and the 'Q' material from which Luke and Matthew have drawn to supplement the story of Mark, but the above description applies to Luke's writings as a whole, and is emphasised again and again in this book. Over against this teaching Dr. Bacon sets carefully and succinctly St. Paul's 'doctrine of Grace through the vicarious suffering of the Servant' (a conception of Jesus arrived at subsequent to Jesus' lifetime, and not shared by Jesus Himself), and finds that the word of the Cross was St. Paul's supreme appeal, set off and supported by his teaching about 'Life in the Spirit.' 'Justification by Faith apart from works of Law was sufficiently guarded from abuse by its companion doctrine of Life in the Spirit.' Our author is quite clear that St. Paul does not teach 'substitutionary atonement,' and says often that the essence of his teaching was 'The love of God which is *in* Christ Jesus our Lord.' Nevertheless he attributes to Paul the making of 'a prodigious change in the significance of Calvary,' partly by his denationalization of the Message, and in other ways as well. Paul's special 'revelation' was 'that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs,' etc. He glories in this, and 'boldly substitutes a Son of God for the Servant of Jehovah, a Second Adam for the Son of David,' and he 'makes no secret of his effort to present the religious aspect of the tragedy (of Jesus' death) rather than the historically realistic.' We cannot here do more than hint at our author's comparison also between Pauline and Petrine teaching, and also that of James, which differs widely from both. Several chapters expound this in a very clear and attractive way.

As we read, we feel we may apply to Dr. Bacon's treatment of these and kindred subjects what he, on p. 212, desiderates in a critic, *viz.* the presence of 'the utmost delicacy and tact' in trying 'to distinguish in the record between historical occurrence and doctrinal, religious, apologetic or theological elaboration.' Under no one of the above heads does the book lack in providing us with suggestive thought, and even if we do not always feel sure that the writer makes his points—as, for instance, in his seeming over-readiness at times to see allusions to the Sacrament of the Eucharist

**The Apostolic Message. A Historical Enquiry*, by Benjamin W. Bacon, D.D., Litt.D. (Oxon.). New York (Century Publishing Co.). $3.50.

—we feel that Professor Bacon has much to teach us on such vital matters as Blood-Atonement, Vicarious Suffering, Salvation by Grace, the Gift of the Spirit (emphasized by him, as by Royce, as 'the really distinctive, and therefore the capital article of the Christian Creed'), 'Why Jesus went to the Cross,' the value of experience as exemplified in Paul's case and in ours, etc., etc. Attention has already been drawn to Dr. Bacon's stress upon the central position the two Sacraments occupy in the life of the Early Church, and the Chapters on the Covenant Supper and on the Primitive Meaning of the Sacraments are full of delightful and profitable teaching. He finds the original witnesses of the Gospel to lie here—'Sacraments are the only witnesses of primitive Christianity which survive unchanged from its earliest beginnings' (p. 89). 'The Apostolic Message crystallized around the two nuclei, baptism and the Supper of the Lord' (p. 316). So the earliest expression of the Gospel is one of ritual, since the oral teaching of the twenty years after the death of Jesus has not survived. And they bore a message of 'teaching both of and about Jesus.' Baptism was the later of the two. 'The Supper is "from the Lord," Baptism transmits the Message as the Apostles received and understood it. In its accompanying phenomena of "The Spirit" it represents their experience' (p. 402). On questions often discussed at present (and notably at the last Annual Conference of Modern Churchmen) with regard to whether Holy Communion was instituted by Jesus and similar topics, Dr. Bacon throws much light, and he does not consider that we need take St. Paul's words in *I Cor.* xi, 23-25, as altogether free from an element of religious interpretation. He is very clear that what Jesus celebrated was, not a Passover, but a *Kiddush* or 'Consecration' meal, in which 'leavened' bread was used, and that 'the Memorial Supper remains His everlasting witness.' It has seemed best in this review to allow our author to speak largely for himself. At the close of the book will be found three interesting chapters on 'The Gospel for our own Time,' 'Gospel and Theology' and 'The Message in Modern Terms.'

DOUGLAS J. GUY.

THE MEN OF LATITUDE.*

There is no body of men in the English Church whom in many ways Modern Churchmen would more desire to emulate than the Christian Platonists or Latitudinarians of the seventeenth century. Bishop Burnet thus describes them in his *History of his own Time* (pp. 341-2):

> 'All these, and those who were formed under them, studied to examine further into the nature of things than had been done formerly. They declared against superstition on the one hand and enthusiasm on the other. They loved the constitution of the Church, and the liturgy, and could well live under them; but they did not think it unlawful to live under another form. They wished that things might have been carried with more moderation. And they continued to keep a good correspondence with those who differed from them in opinion, and allowed a great freedom both in philosophy and in divinity: from whence they were called men of latitude. And upon this, men of narrower thought and fiercer tempers fastened upon them the name of Latitudinarians. They read Episcopius much. And the making out the reasons of things being a main part of their studies, their enemies called them Socinians. They were all very zealous against Popery. And so, they becoming soon very considerable, the Papists set them-

* *The Cambridge Platonists*—A Study by F. J. Powicke, Ph.D. (J. M. Dent. 1926. Price 7/6 net.).

selves against them to decry them as atheists, deists, or at the best Socinians.'

We are grateful therefore to Dr. Powicke, well known as a student of English religion in the seventeenth century and the author of delightful studies of Richard Baxter and his devoted wife, for treating the Cambridge Platonists in his latest volume. Dr. Powicke begins with an illuminating Prologue mainly historical. He then presents his readers with separate studies of Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, Nathaniel Culverwell, Henry More, Peter Sterry, and concludes with an Epilogue.

It was the colleges of Emmanuel, Christ's, and Queen's which bred these men. If they were to be the product of either University, it must needs be Cambridge. It could not be Oxford, which was entirely Aristotelian. Not the least interesting of the Cambridge Platonists was Sterry (Dr. Powicke's discovery). He was a member of the Westminster Assembly, and became one of Cromwell's chaplains. He wrote a *Persuasive to Moderation* in which he strove to be a preacher of Divine Love. After Naseby he celebrated 'England's deliverance from the Northern Presbytery compared with a deliverance from the Roman Papacy.'

We cannot here attempt any account of their system. They were not all consistent thinkers: they seem to have been much more consistent in their characters. They believed in Reason as the candle of the Lord within them and that by which they must judge all things, even Divine Revelation: they believed in Christ as the Light of Light, man's supreme illuminator: they believed in Love as the highest and most needful Christian virtue: they believed in moral conduct as an indispensable qualification for the perception of Divine Truth. Perhaps the single sentence which best expresses their cardinal conviction is that of Whichcote: 'Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual—for spiritual is most rational.'

Dr. Powicke has given us a very interesting book, abounding with suggestions and wise reflections. Its illustrations include portraits of Cudworth, Whichcote, and More. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

Perhaps Dr. Martin will wish me to solve the one doubt which he expresses in his judgment on my book, *The Anglo-Catholic Faith*. From a passage on p. 176 he infers, 'perhaps incorrectly,' that in experience 'the episcopate becomes equivalent to actual bishops.' I will not say that his inference is incorrect, but it is incomplete. I was there speaking of one matter of order which appears to be committed to the discretion of 'the bishop actually in control.' There, and so far, he does represent the episcopate. Every polity, civil or ecclesiastical, finds room for such discretionary powers. There are some, for example, exercised by a churchwarden, some by a constable. But like these minim officials, a bishop may be corrected for a misuse of his discretion. He may de deposed by a council of bishops; in some cases, even by a metropolitan. He is at no time an irresponsible autocrat.

May I thank Dr. Martin for his treatment of my book? Such careful reading is the finest compliment that can be paid to an author.

T. A. LACEY.

The College, Worcester.